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BIRTH AFTER DEATH: PERPETUITIES AND
THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES
Sharona Hoffman* & Andrew P. Morriss**
INTRODUCTION
The Rule Against Perpetuities ("Rule" or "RAP") has long
terrorized law students and lawyers alike: "no interest is good
unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after
some life in being at the creation of the interest."' Despite this
deceptively simple formulation, the Rule's complexities have
bedeviled generations of property students and practitioners on both
sides of the Atlantic. Reformers argue that the Rule's complexity is
unnecessary to achieve the Rule's objectives2 and turns it into
merely a malpractice trap.
3
Despite this "reign of terror,"4 the Rule continues to apply in
various forms in most U.S. jurisdictions and in England today,
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for comments and suggestions.
** Galen J. Roush Professor of Business Law & Regulation & Director, Center for
Business Law & Regulation, Case Western Reserve University School of Law and Senior
Associate, Property & Environment Research Center, Bozeman, Montana. A.B., Princeton,
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Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1994.
JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201 (4th ed. 1942).
2 Paul G. Haskell, A Proposal for A Simple and Socially Effective Rule Against
Perpetuities, 66 N.C. L. REV. 545, 564 (1988) (noting that "[tihe complexity and esoterica [of
the Rule] are unnecessary to achieve the social objective of the Rule").
' See Jesse Dukeminier, Perpetuities: The Measuring Lives, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1648,
1656 n.23 (1985) (attributing reforms of Rule to malpractice actions: "That malpractice
liability generates reform legislation is fairly demonstrable"); Lawrence W. Waggoner,
Perpetuity Reform, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1718, 1726-27 (1983) (describing most "technical" Rule
violations as "probably... recognizable only by lawyers schooled in the Rule's intricacies" yet
correctable if "prudently drafted by a Rule-wise lawyer immediately before the effective date
of the transfer without changing their substance at all").
W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror, 65
HARv. L. REV. 721 (1952). But see Robert L. Fletcher, Perpetuities: Basic Clarity, Muddled
Reform, 63 WASH. L. REV. 791, 793 (1988) ("[T]he Rule is not all that complicated, and, for
those who like precision and internal consistency, it has a charming, almost mathematical
quality.").
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partly because it protects important social interests,5 but partly
because of inertia. The Rule is complex and esoteric, two qualities
unlikely to induce state legislatures to take up the banner of
reform.6
The development of new reproductive technologies ("NRTs"),
however, poses a serious threat to the Rule, one that could eliminate
the Rule's ability to function. Human cloning, for example, has gone
from science fiction to a subject for debate in Congress. Scientists
have begun experimenting with the cloning of early stage human
embryos,' and one group has claimed (apparently falsely) the birth
of a cloned human.9 As a result of the availability of these reproduc-
tive technologies, even dead people will have to be presumed to be
fertile, and the period of "actual gestation" ° included within the
Rule's period could be indefinitely extended by the existence of
frozen embryos."
Without reforms to address this threat, in a few years, or perhaps
tomorrow, a case will arise that forces the court to choose between
an interpretation of the Rule that strikes many future interests
6 These interests are frequently overlooked but are present nonetheless. See Haskell,
supra note 2, at 545 (arguing that Rule's 'societal purpose" is "often overlooked").
8 See Joel C. Dobris, The Death of the Rule Against Perpetuities, or the RAP Has No
Friends-An Essay, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 603-04 (2000) ("Except for a few law
professors, tax bureaucrats, and even fewer reform-minded trusts and estates practitioners,
society does not seem to care anymore about perpetuities, dynasties, dynastic property, and
'baronies.' ").
7 See, e.g., Mike Allen, Abortion, Cloning Are on Bush Agenda, WASH. POST, Jan. 23,
2003, at A4 ("White House senior adviser Karl Rove, outlining plans that would have sounded
improbable just three months ago, said yesterday that bans on late-term abortions and
human cloning are high on President Bush's agenda and should be achievable in the new
Congress."); Rick Weiss, Debate About Cloning Returns to Congress; Senate Considers Ban
Affecting Human Embryos, WASH. POST, Jan. 30,2003, at A9 (describing"contentious debate"
over cloning in Senate).
" Jose B. Cibelli et al., The First Human Cloned Embryo, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, Jan.
2002, at 45 (describing successful cloning of human embryo to six-cell stage and development
of early stage embryos from eggs that were not fertilized by sperm).
9 See, e.g., Nell Boyce & James M. Pethokoukis, Clowns or Cloners?, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Jan. 13, 2003, at 48, 48 (describing Raelians' claims). This claim has not been
substantiated. See Kenneth Chang, Saying that Hoax is Possible, Journalist Leaves Cloning
Tests, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2003, at A12 (reporting growing skepticism of Raelian cloning
claims).
'0 See infra notes 213-15 and accompanying text.
" The reader who is not sure what this means need not worry; we discuss these issues
in great detail below. See infra notes 87-194 and accompanying text.
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involving children and other descendants as invalid and an interpre-
tation that almost entirely eviscerates the Rule. Either alternative's
consequences-eliminating (or at least severely restricting) a set of
future interests or eliminating the Rule's important
protections-has serious and unwelcome social consequences. In
this Article, we outline the problems posed by the development of
new reproductive technologies for the Rule Against Perpetuities and
propose reforms to address those problems.
In Part I, we describe the Rule Against Perpetuities, the policies
behind the Rule, and past attempts at reform.12 In Part II, we
describe several current and potential reproductive technologies
that pose a threat to the Rule.' 3 In Part III, we describe the
problems these technologies pose for the Rule.' 4 In Part IV, we
propose reforms designed to protect the policy interests served by
the Rule and prevent the problems caused by the new reproductive
technologies. "
I. THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
Although many, if not all, American law students are subjected
to the Rule Against Perpetuities during their first year Property
course or a Wills and Estates course, the Rule is so misunderstood
that a brief review is necessary. Perhaps the most important point
is that there is no single "Rule Against Perpetuities" in the United
States today. 6 Although most law texts begin with the common law
version of the Rule, there are actually four different approaches to
the Rule that differ significantly in a number of ways: the common
law Rule; the "wait-and-see" Rule; the cy pres modification of the
Rule; and the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities
("USRAP"). 17
12 See infra notes 16-86 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 87-151 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 152-94 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 195-241 and accompanying text.
16 See Mary Louise Fellows, Testing Perpetuity Reforms: A Study of Perpetuity Cases
1984-89,25 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR.J. 597,608 (1991) (noting"wide variety of perpetuity laws
in force around the country today").
"7 There are also a number of differences between specific state statutes implementing
the various approaches. These need not concern us here.
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A. COMMON LAW RULE
The most familiar approach to perpetuities is the common law
Rule, succinctly articulated by Professor John Chipman Gray in
1886 and quoted at the start of this Article.' 8 To illustrate the basic
rule, consider T's will that leaves Blackacre "to my son A, and then
to my first grandchild to reach twenty-five." The contingent
remainder following A's life estate violates the common law Rule
even if T's oldest grandchild is twenty-four at the time of his death,
because the remainder might vest more than twenty-one years from
the death of the relevant lives-in-being. Suppose all living grand-
children die and a new grandchild is born after T's death. A then
dies before the new grandchild reaches age four. The grandchild's
interest would vest, if at all, more than twenty-one years later. The
gift is therefore void, since only T, A, and the grandchild (who is
alive at the time of T's death) can be used as lives-in-being.
The common law rule has three main characteristics:
0 It is a rule of logical possibility-if individuals who
affect vesting are alive, then they are assumed to be
able to do any act possible for a living person, includ-
ing bearing children at advanced ages, marrying
people not born at the time of the gift, and so forth.
Gifts are therefore void "if there is any possibility,
however unlikely, that the perpetuity period (lives in
being plus twenty-one years) will be exceeded."19 This
is true even if by the time of the litigation, the contin-
gencies have been resolved.2"
1s GRAY, supra note 1, § 201 (noting that original formulation was slightly different but
functionally equivalent).
'" Robert E. Megarry, Comment, 81 L.Q. REV. 478, 481 (1965). The author noted that
It] his part of the rule is so fundamental, and so highly stressed by all the books and teachers,
that he who does not know it must be expected to know little or nothing of the rest of the
rule." Id. It was this precise point, however, that led the California Supreme Court to hold
that the Rule was too complex to allow malpractice claims against attorneys who violate it.
See Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 690 (Cal. 1961). But see Wright v. Williams, 47 Cal. App.
3d 802, 809 n.2 (1975) (suggesting Lucas is no longer valid).
20 Leach, supra note 4, at 729.
578 [Vol. 38:575
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" The Rule is applied to interests prospectively. That
is, at the time the transfer is made (the time of an
inter vivos transfer or when a will goes into effect),
the Rule is applied as of that date and with only the
knowledge of events then available.2'
" Violations of the Rule lead to the striking of at least
the invalid interest.22 This "all or nothing" nature
gives potential litigants a powerful economic incen-
tive to bring claims involving the Rule.23
These three characteristics determine how the Rule will be
applied and limit the policy objectives it can serve. First, the Rule
serves the interest of certainty of title by providing that invalid
interests are immediately struck or, at least, struck after litigation.
Thus, we know now (or at least after suing someone) which interests
are good and which are not.
Second, the Rule imperfectly advances the policy of facilitating
transferability of property. The common law Rule requires that
interests vest in interest, not that they vest in possession. Because
a vested interest may not result in possession for many years, even
vested future interests can cause problems for conveying title. This
is so because the holders of all the interests must jointly act to
convey a fee simple title to the asset.24 There is thus a problem of
long-lived multiple interests that raise the transaction costs of land
21 Id.
2 See Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Uniform Statutory RuleAgainst Perpetuities,21 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 569, 570 (1986) ("A single chain of imagined events that could postpone
vesting (or termination) beyond the permissible period spoils the testator's disposition."). The
doctrine of "infectious invalidity" can lead to additional interests being struck. See ROBERT
J. LYNN, THE MODERN RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 135 (1966) (explaining doctrine as
allowing bad interest to lead to striking of interests that themselves pass under Rule because
bad limitation is essential to donor's dispositive plan); W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities
Legislation: Hail, Pennsylvania!, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1124, 1147-49 (1960) (discussing
infectious invalidity).
2 Leach, supra note 22, at 1132, 1150.
24 See Haskell, supra note 2, at 561:
If the future interests are contingent because the holders are unborn, it
is peculiarly difficult to convey the fee. But even if the future interests
are vested, which requires that the holders be presently identifiable,
alienability is nevertheless fettered because it takes the joinder of the
holders of successive interests to convey the fee.
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transactions. The Rule provides imperfect protection against these,
because properly drafted interests can "be made to endure for
generations without a technical violation of the Rule."25 Since many
people live into their eighties and beyond, "twenty-one years after
some life in being at the creation of the interest"26 can amount to
over one hundred years.
Third, the Rule imperfectly guards against fractionation of title.28
Where multiple owners share title to property, a "tragedy of the
anti-commons" may result, preventing use of the property. 29 Its
protection against over-fractionation is imperfect because even
where the Rule strikes future interests, it does not necessarily
result in consolidating interests in property. In the infamous case
of Brown v. Independent Baptist Church of Woburn,3" the striking of
the invalid future interest led to the distribution of the property
under the residual clause of a ninety-year-old will, leading to the
expenditure of more than $9,000 out of the property's value of
$34,000 to locate the heirs.31 The Rule thus imperfectly guards
against inalienability due to fractionated land titles.32
25 Leonard Levin & Michael Mulroney, The RuleAgainst Perpetuities and the Generation-
Skipping Tax: Do We Need Both?, 35 VaL. L. REV. 333, 345 (1990).26 GRAY, supra note 1, § 201, at 191.
27 For example, a standard savings clause, such as one specifying the names of twelve
healthy babies as measuring lives, can greatly extend the perpetuities period. See JESSE
DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 837,875 (5th ed. 1995)
(noting that actuarial statistics predict that at least one of twelve healthy babies should live
to at least eighty years old, thus "12 healthy babies" clause should produce validating lives
that provide a perpetuities period of more than 100 years). A savings clause protects an
instrument against inadvertent violation of the Rule through a variety of mechanisms. See
W. Barton Leach & James K. Logan, Perpetuities: A Standard Saving Clause to Avoid
Violations of the Rule, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1141, 1141-47 (1961).
2 "Fractionation of title" refers to the division of the bundle of rights that make up a fee
simple absolute into multiple bundles held by separate individuals. As the number of
individuals holding some of the rights that make up a fee simple absolute title increases, the
danger of an anticommons increases. See infra note 29 for explanation of"anticommons."
2' See generally Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons, 111 HARV. L. REV.
621 (1998) (describing anticommons problems that arose in former Soviet Union as result of
fractionated title to property). A tragedy of the anticommons is the opposite of a tragedy of
the commons. Excessive division of a property's title among multiple owners results in an
inability to use the property because the transaction costs of reaching an agreement on the
use are too high. Id. at 677.
'o 91 N.E.2d 922 (Mass. 1950).
31 Leach, supra note 4, at 743.
32 See Levin & Mulroney, supra note 25, at 335 ("One of the primary methods of
preventing restraints on the alienation of property is embodied in the Rule Against
580 [Vol. 38:575
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Fourth, the Rule imperfectly guards against excessive dead hand
limitations"3 on marketability by restricting some, but not all,
remote interests." The balance struck by the common law Rule is
generally stated as being that one should be able to control only for
the lives of persons known to the grantor or testator.35 As Professor
Leach noted, however, almost all perpetuities violations result from
one of these conditions: (1) a gift being contingent on a person
reaching an age of more than twenty-one; (2) a gift including
persons unborn at the time of the gift; or (3) inclusion of a contin-
gency unrelated to age or lives that could occur more than twenty-
one years after the creation of the interest.3"
Finally, the Rule applies to a wide range of interests. In addition
to the familiar problems of gifts of future interests in real property,
which happens less frequently today than in medieval England,
courts have also applied the Rule to a variety of other interests,
including options to purchase and rights of first refusal.3 7 Although
Perpetuities.").
' "Dead hand control" refers to continued control of assets by a deceased former owner
through restrictions on the subsequent owners.
' See Ira Mark Bloom, Perpetuities Refinement: There Is an Alternative, 62 WASH. L.
REV. 23, 25-26 (1987) ("That the Rule serves a useful societal purpose by limiting dead hand
control is a viewpoint almost unanimously accepted."); Levin & Mulroney, supra note 25, at
333 (noting that Rule expresses policy "that it is undesirable to permit the unrestrained
freeze of property ownership in the hands of subsequent owners in modes that are inflexible
or obsolete"). Remote interests retained by the grantor, such as rights of re-entry, are
generally exempt from the common law Rule. See Robert J. Lynn, Perpetuities Literacy for
the 21st Century, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 219,223 (1989) (noting right ofre-entry retained by grantor
and not invalidated by Rule). But see W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities: The Nutshell Revisited,
78 HARV. L. REV. 973, 980 (1965) ("Few states are committed to exempting rights of entry and
possibilities of reverter from the Rule; the arguments against any other state so exempting
them are, in the opinion of the present writer, overwhelming.").
Jesse Dukeminier, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities: Ninety Years in
Limbo, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1023, 1053 (1987).
3 Leach, supra note 4, at 735.
17 See Gregory G. Gosfield, A Primer on Real Estate Options, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR.
J. 129, 146-47 (2000) (discussing need to draft carefully to avoid perpetuities issues in
options); J.A. Bryant, Jr., Annotation, Pre-emptive Rights to Realty as Violation of Rule
Against PerpetuitiesorRule ConcerningRestraints onAlienation, 40A.L.R. 3D 920,924 (1971)
("All but a few of the cases which have considered the point have concluded that the common-
law rule against perpetuities (if in force in the jurisdiction) is applicable to pre-emptive
rights."). The Restatement (Third) of Property excludes coverage of options for the purchase
of land, however, and so this problem may be reduced in the future. RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF PROP.: SERVITUDES, § 3.3, cmt. a (2000). Options to purchase are interests that give an
entity the right to purchase a property during some future period. Rights of first refusal grant
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we rely on the simpler wills examples in this Article, the analysis is
equally applicable to the Rule's effect on these other interests. The
Rule's application to these additional interests means that the
impact of the NRTs on the Rule goes well beyond the estate
planning context.
Several approaches have been used to address the above
described problems, resulting in three modified versions of the
common law Rule.
B. WAIT-AND-SEE
A reaction to the stringency of the common law Rule,3" the wait-
and-see approach allows interests that would be struck under the
common law Rule to be saved by waiting through the perpetuities
period (lives in being plus twenty-one years) to see whether or not
an event occurs.39 This principle was adopted by the American Law
Institute in 1979 in the second Restatement.0 Interests that satisfy
the common law Rule automatically satisfy the wait-and-see Rule;
interests that fail the common law Rule may satisfy the wait-and-
see Rule.4' Analysis under a wait-and-see Rule Against Perpetuities
an entity the right to purchase a property before any other offer can be accepted.
38 Bloom, supra note 34, at 28 (noting that "[tihe wait-and-see approach developed in
response to the alleged harshness of the common law Rule Against Perpetuities").
39 There have been a variety of wait-and-see approaches based on imposing limits on how
long one will wait. See Dukeminier, supra note 35, at 1072-77 (describing possible approaches
and their advantages and disadvantages).
40 See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 1.4, cmt. a (1983)
("Section 1.4 adopts the wait-and-see approach . ); id., introductory note, at 12-14
(explaining choice of wait-and-see approach).
41 Professor Dukeminier suggests that the wait-and-see Rule actually
replaces the what-might-happen test of the common law Rule. Inasmuch
as each and every one of the causally-related lives assembled for the
purpose of applying the common law Rule is included on the list of lives
that measure the wait-and-see period, it is not necessary to test these
casually-related lives to try to frind a validating life. Whether an interest
violates the what-might-happen test is of no legal consequence. The only
purpose served in testing for what might happen is to find out whether
the interest is certain to be valid, which may be useful information, but
testing is not otherwise required.
Dukeminier, supra note 3, at 174. We disagree that knowing if an interest is valid at the
outset merely "may be useful" and therefore think that the shift of interests between the two
prongs of the wait-and-see test matters a great deal. The difference is that an interest that
passes the common law Rule is valid immediately, while an interest that fails the common
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is thus a two-stage process. In the first step, a transaction is
analyzed under the common law Rule. If the transaction is good
under the common law Rule, then it is good under the modified
Rule. If the transaction fails under the common law Rule, then the
wait-and-see portion of the Rule applies. In this step, the
"essential operation" of the modified Rule "involves waiting to see
whether a nonvested interest actually vests or terminates within
some time period."43 If the interest vests or terminates within the
period allowed, then the interest is good. If the interest does not
vest or terminate, the interest is either struck or reformed by the
court. A variety of wait-and-see approaches exist, depending on how
the waiting period is determined.""
Thus, in the earlier example of a contingent remainder "to my
first grandchild to reach twenty-five," the interest would be good if
a grandchild actually reached twenty-five within twenty-one years
of A's death or if a grandchild living at the time of the testator's
death reached twenty-five, rather than being void because of the
possibility that a hypothetical afterborn grandchild might be the
first to reach twenty-five more than twenty-one years after the
death of the testator and the grandchildren living at the time of the
testator's death.
The wait-and-see approach trades offcertainty of title, simplicity,
and some marketability for increased attention to donor/grantor
intent.45 It advances no additional policy objectives and weakens
law Rule can be determined to be valid only by waiting until the events needed to know
whether it is valid or not have occurred.
42 See Haskell, supra note 2, at 554 ("It is only if the interest fails to comply with the
common law Rule that wait-and-see comes into play using the specifically designated lives.").
43 Bloom, supra note 34, at 30.
" Some reformers advocate waiting a fixed period, and others advocate either a period
based on particular lives or based on the set of lives used under the common law Rule. See
Bloom, supra note 34, at 30-32 (summarizing debate on this issue). Various reforms have
adopted each of these approaches. See Dukeminier, supra note 3, at 1648-49 (summarizing
differences).
4' There is also significant disagreement concerning who the measuring lives (i.e., those
lives used to determine the perpetuities period) are under the wait-and-see Rule. See, e.g.,
Dukeminier, supra note 3, at 1654-74 (describing operation of wait-and-see); Haskell, supra
note 2, at 552-56 (noting "imprecise nature" of measuring lives under wait-and-see). Wait-
and-see systems are more complex than the common law Rule. See Bloom, supra note 34, at
47 (noting that complexity is critical flaw of wait-and-see systems). Professor Waggoner, who
drafted the USRAP and its wait-and-see provisions, argues that there is no increase in
583
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some of the traditional common law Rule policy objectives46 by
extending the period of dead hand control and allowing interests to
survive for a time when they would otherwise be stricken at the
outset.47
C. CY PRES
The second "reform" mechanism to address the perpetuities
problem is incorporated into both the Restatement's wait-and-see
approach s and the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities.49
Under cy pres, or reformation, courts can "reform a future interest
that violates the Rule Against Perpetuities to make it conform to the
Rule in a manner approximating the intention of the donor." ° Some
cy pres advocates argue that the courts should be able to insert a
savings clause into the will or other instrument.5 With the original
uncertainty because the only interests that will trigger the wait-and-see provisions are
already quite uncertain because they are nonvested and contingent. Waggoner, supra note
22, at 573.
' Any wait-and-see reform also alters the distribution of which interests will survive the
Rule. As Professor Dukeminier pointed out in an article critical of the USRAP but equally
applicable on this point to all wait-and-see reforms,
wait-and-see will not often come to the rescue of the skilled draftsman,
who will routinely insert an appropriate perpetuities saving clause. Wait-
and-see almost always will affect families whose ancestor consulted an
average lawyer or, worse, drew the will himself. The inept work of a
thoughtless draftsman will be saved for the wait-and-see period. The
testator's descendants may be left in a straightjacket.
Dukeminier, supra note 35, at 1037.
47 See id. at 1050-51 (discussing policy objections to wait-and-see approach). Critics of
the wait-and-see approach also argue that it is incoherent because "there is no principled way
to determine the length of the waiting period within the framework of the common law Rule
Against Perpetuities." Susan F. French, Perpetuities: Three Essays in Honor of My Father,
65 WASH. L. REV. 323, 333 (1990). See Waggoner, supra note 22, at 573 ("The greatest
controversy over wait-and-see concerns how to determine the allowable waiting period-the
time allotted for the contingencies to be validly worked out to a final resolution.").
48 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 1.5 (1983).
49 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE
LAWS, Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities, 965 (1990) [hereinafter USRAP].
5 Haskell, supra note 2, at 556. See also Dukeminier, supra note 35, at 1071 (describing
how cy pres works).
51 See Olin L. Browder, Jr., Construction, Reformation, and the RuleAgainst Perpetuities,
62 MIcH. L. REv. 1, 5-6 (1963) (suggesting that "an obvious verbal reformation in the form of
a savings clause" readily disposes of fertile octogenarian cases and "the rest of the company
of improbable possibilities"); see infra notes 160-61 and accompanying text (defining fertile
octogenarian problem).
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perpetuities Rule, or in the case of the wait-and-see reforms or
Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities,5 2 both the original
Rule and the alternative secondary perpetuities Rule53 are applied.
Some interests pass these perpetuities tests; for these interests
there is no change. For those that fail the original (or revised)
perpetuities test, the court attempts to construct an interest that
passes the perpetuities Rule and that approximates the transferor's
intent.
For example, suppose that a grant is made "to such of John
Smith's children as reach twenty-five." The gift would be invalid
under the common law Rule. 4 Under the cy pres approach, the
court could reform the gift to read "to such of John Smith's children
who reach twenty-one"5 and rescue the gift rather than invalidating
it.
The cy pres doctrine helps resolve the incentive issues caused by
the "all-or-nothing" character of the common law Rule, because a
successful challenge to an interest will receive only the benefit of the
reformation. Since the reformation is to approximate the intent of
the grantor or testator, "the spectrum of choices is very narrow,
hardly worth litigating."5 6
The cy pres approach thus depends on being able to identify those
interests that fail the basic (or revised) perpetuities Rule and to
alter the terms of those interests so that they pass the perpetuities
Rule. Like the wait-and-see approach, the cy pres approach
weakens the basic Rule to defer more to grantor intent or an
approximation thereof.
52 See infra notes 57-70 (discussing Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities).
' Under the wait-and-see approach, for example, one would wait until an event occurred
that violated the Rule and then reform the instrument. This could take decades.
" Suppose Smith has existing children who are ten and fourteen. Clearly, those children
will reach twenty-five or not within their own lives. The gift is invalid, however, because both
those children could die, Smith could have a third child, and Smith might then die before this
new child turned four.
' Now Smith can serve as a measuring life, since any children (including those conceived
and in utero but not born before Smith's death) will reach twenty-one (or not) within twenty-
one years (plus any actual gestation period) of Smith's death.
' Leach, supra note 22, at 1150.
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D. USRAP
Proposed by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws in 1986,57 the Uniform Statutory Rule Against
Perpetuities ("USRAP") provides a combination of the common law
rule,5 8 a ninety year wait-and-see savings provision, 9 a reformation
power for courts to correct interests that fail,6" and a specific
directive that "the possibility that a child will be born to an
individual after the individual's death is disregarded.""1 The
USRAP approach has been widely endorsed,62 although some
perpetuities experts have criticized it as unsound.
As with the other reforms, the USRAP allows interests that pass
the common law rule to continue unaltered and affects only those
interests that do not survive under the common law RAP. 4 For
those interests that do not pass the common law Rule, the USRAP
combines a wait-and-see approach determined by a specific time
period and the reformation power. By bringing together both the
wait-and-see approach and the reformation approach to interests
that fail the common law RAP, the USRAP "saves" the largest
" USRAP, supra note 49, at 965.
USRAP, supra note 49, § l(aX1), at 984.
" Id. § l(a)(2), at 984.
60 Id. § 3, at 1037.
6' Id. § l(d), at 985. Some states have created rebuttable presumptions about fertility.
See, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS, & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.3(eXl) (1992) (creating presumption that
males can have child at fourteen or older and females between twelve and fifty-five). Such
a presumption is likely to be easier to rebut as the new reproductive technologies (NRTs)
become more common. See, e.g., David K. Kadane, Perpetuities Reform: Part One, 63 N.Y.
ST. B.J. 40, 42-43 (Oct. 1991) ("No stretch of imagination is required today to envision
circumstances where these presumptions could be rebutted, particularly with the help of
administered hormones and fertility clinic personnel, but these developments came after [the
statute was enacted]. One can speculate as to the possible impact of modern reproductive
engineering.").
' The USRAP has been endorsed by the ABA Section on Real Property, Probate and
Trust Law; the American College of Probate Counsel; the Board of Governors of the American
College of Real Estate Lawyers; the Joint Editorial Board for the Uniform Probate Code; and
others. Ronald C. Link & Kimberly A. Licata, Perpetuities Reform in North Carolina: The
Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities, Nondonative Transfers, and Honorary Trusts,
74 N.C. L. REv. 1783, 1789 (1996). See also Fellows, supra note 16, at 607 (listing
endorsements).
63 See, e.g., Dukeminier, supra note 35.
4 Waggoner, supra note 22, at 572.
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number of interests. The costs of this increased power to save
interests that would otherwise be stricken are two-fold.
First, the ninety-year wait-and-see period creates substantial
uncertainty for those interests that fail the common law Rule and
are of uncertain vesting. 5 As Professor Dukeminier explains,
"[glenerally, no interest can be declared void for 90 years."6 In
many cases, the heirs will be dead and only their heirs (a second or
third generation) will inherit. Second, some opponents of the
USRAP argue that it will lead to an increase in dead hand control
by facilitating long term trusts. 7 Briefly, by determining the
perpetuities period to be ninety years, when the "measuring lives"
approach often produced shorter periods, the USRAP allows the
creation of interests that vest later than they would under a wait-
and-see approach built around the common law Rule's measuring
lives. Donors and grantors are thus able to control the property
interests they create far longer than they could under the common
law Rule. Third, the reformation power allocates to courts far
removed temporally from donors the task of divining donor intent
and using it to craft a substitute interest.68
Interestingly, the USRAP acknowledges the problem of the
posthumous birth of descendants by insisting that the law close its
eyes to reality.69 Indeed, it is ironic that the Rule, so heavily
' Consider a gift of Blackacre "to the Baptist Church, but if the church ceases to use
Blackacre for church purposes, then to A and her heirs." Dukeminier, supra note 35, at 1043.
A's interest is struck by the common law rule because the church might cease to use
Blackacre for church purposes after the end of all lives in being at the time of the gift. A
cannot serve as a measuring life because he might be dead. His interest, however, would then
be held by his heirs. Under the USRAP, it would last ninety years. Id. at 1043. Interests
that are certain to vest within ninety years are validated immediately, of course.
6 Id. at 1024. Because a posthumously born child is almost always theoretically possible
with at least some NRTs during the ninety-year period, it will more often be necessary to wait
the full ninety years to determine that an interest is invalid.
' Id. at 1039-43.
6 See id. at 1025 (noting that USRAP "gives courts about as broad a power as can be
imagined to make a will for a person dead for some 90 years").
68 USRAP § 1(d). See, e.g., Amy Morris Hess, Freeing Property Owners from the RAP
Trap: Tennessee Adopts the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities, 62 TENN. L. REV.
267,275 (1995) (arguing that NRTs raise "numerous substantial and complex questions in the
law of construction of wills and trusts as well as in the law of intestate succession. Until
these matters are resolved generally in the law of construction of documents, the simplest
way to deal with them in the context of perpetuities reform is to disregard the possibility of
the birth of such a child.").
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criticized for striking interests based on implausible factual
scenarios,7" is now being"reformed" to mandate ignoring those same
factual scenarios just as they become factually plausible. Although
we disagree with the specific solution adopted by the USRAP, the
statute's explicit consideration of the problem is the best route to
resolving the problems caused by the NRTs and shapes our solution
proposed below.
E. SUMMARY
The common law Rule provides a less than completely effective
means of addressing dead hand control issues but does so at the cost
of technical complexity. This complexity can generally be success-
fully addressed by proper drafting, although it may require some
modification of donors' plans to do so.7' The wait-and-see ap-
proaches will strike fewer interests than the common law Rule, but
at the cost of allowing additional dead hand control.72 Cy pres
rescues interests that fail, alleviating the harshness of the common
law Rule's "all or nothing" approach, but it requires court interven-
tion to validate interests that fail the Rule. The USRAP weakens
the common law more than any of the other alternative reforms
because it combines all of them. All three reform versions make
additional tradeoffs of the policies served by the Rule for measures
to mitigate its harshness. The modern trend is thus to accept
weaker protection of the interests served by the Rule in exchange for
greater attention to donor intent.
The Rule Against Perpetuities, in whatever form, serves several
important social interests, and reform should take those interests
into account. First, the Rule is a means of limiting "dead hand"
control of wealth, or legal control of productive assets by the
deceased former owner. It is, however, an imperfect means of doing
70 See infra note 80 and accompanying text.
71 See, e.g., Bloom, supra note 34, at 27 (noting "agreement that perpetuities violations
caused by technicalities may be avoided by competent drafting"); Waggoner, supra note 3, at
1726 (noting that requirement of initial certainty "is not an obstacle to a skilled lawyer's
implementation of reasonable client objectives").
7 See Bloom, supra note 34, at 32 (noting that fixed period wait-and-see approach may
"unnecessarily and undesirably extend dead hand control').
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so, as it does not apply to all forms of such control.v3 Second, it
protects (imperfectly) against assets becoming unmarketable due to
excessive temporal fractionation of ownership into uncertain future
interests by striking out some future interests and so reducing the
number of future interests in any given property.74 Again, the Rule
is an imperfect means of doing so, as it does not apply to all future
interests or all forms of property.7" Third, the Rule allows current
property owners to protect incompetent, profligate, or minor
potential heirs by limiting their interests in gifts of property and so
prevents them from squandering the entire property. It thus
balances the competing social interests of limiting dead hand control
and allowing property owners to protect their heirs.76
The Rule's protections come at a high cost, however. A violation
of the Rule results in the striking of interests (except under cy pres
reforms), which causes an additional problem. Most Rule experts
73 Some jurisdictions, for example, do not apply the Rule to some equitable interests. For
example, South Dakota and Wisconsin allow perpetual trusts if the trustee has the power to
alienate the property. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-5-4 (Michie 1997); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
700.16(3) (West 2001). The Rule is also an imperfect check because, as virtually every
commentator on the Rule notes, a good lawyer can accomplish most ends without violating
the Rule-or as Professor Philip Mechem noted more colorfully, "the rule doesn't conspicu-
ously stand in the way of unsocial people with good lawyers." Leach, supra note 22, at 1142
(quoting Mechem).
74 This concern is reduced today when the main form of such property is interests in a
trust, enabling the trustee to conduct transactions concerning trust assets. See Haskell,
supra note 2, at 548 ("[O]riginal purpose of the Rule was to impose a time limit on dispositive
provisions that made it difficult or impossible to convey a possessory fee in land, thereby
effectively removing the land from commerce."); Waggoner, supra note 22, at 587 (noting that
scholars have difficult time identifying policies of Rule).
7' English courts had a broad view of the perpetuities problem and
thought that perpetuities were harmful to the economic, social, and
political life of the realm. The judiciary thought that perpetuities
interfered with commerce, fostered discipline problems by assuring the
youth their inheritance, and allowed traitors' wealth to pass to their
families rather than to be forfeited to the crown. Perpetuities, they said,
"fought] against God, for pretend[ing] to such a stability in human affairs,
as the nature of them admits not of."
Stephen A. Siegel, John Chipman Gray, Legal Formalism, and the Transformation of
Perpetuities Law, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 439, 441 (1982).
76 See id. at 456 ("Traditionalists and reformers generally agree on the goal that
perpetuities law does and should pursue: a measured restraint on alienability that
concomitantly respects the desire of past, present, and future generations to do what they
wish with the wealth they enjoy."). See also Fletcher, supra note 4, at 794 (noting that Rule
"controls or limits the creation of uncertainty in the ownership and enjoyment of property,
though it does so with remarkable tolerance").
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agree that Rule violations are generally instances of "persons who,
starting from reasonable plans for the support of their families, have
run afoul of the Rule through the ignorance or oversight of the
particular member of our profession to whom they have entrusted
their affairs" rather than "testators and settlors who have long-term
designs which press against the limits of the Rule."77 Striking an
interest leads to the receipt of the property in question by someone
else, someone to whom the grantor did not intend to convey the
property.78 This unjustly enriches the unintended taker at the
expense of the intended taker.79  Eliminating such unjust enrich-
ment is thus an additional policy reason to reform the Rule in light
of the NRTs.
Critics of the Rule Against Perpetuities also point to the obscurity
of the Rule's implications, the near-physical impossibility of some of
the events that trigger the rule,8 ° and the complexity of the common
law Rule."' Even the various attempts at reform have produced
debates over particular provisions, suggesting that while reform of
77 Leach, supra note 4, at 722-23. The widespread use of savings clauses in wills has
reduced the problem of inadvertent Rule violations in that context and shifted it to
transactions involving interests such as options. The appearance of the NRTs, however, is
likely to mean that savings clauses will be necessary where they were not in the past. For
a definition of "savings clauses" see supra note 27.
" See Waggoner, supra note 3, at 1757 (noting that mistake by lawyer leads to
transferring property to someone other than intended beneficiary).
79 Id. at 1752. Others have noted that lawyers are "unjustly" enriched by use of cy pres
to prevent this. See Bloom, supra note 34, at 46 ("Enactment of deferred cy pres legislation
will add a class of unintended beneficiaries: unborn lawyers. The staggering fees Professor
Leach complained about [in deferred cy pres cases] may be commonplace in deferred cy pres
litigation.").
80 See, e.g., French, supra note 47, at 333 ("[N]o one disagrees with [Professor Barton
Leach's] basic premise that the common law Rule goes too far in striking down reasonable
dispositions because of remote and fantastical possibilities."). The original fertile octogenar-
ian case of Jee v. Audley, 29 Eng. Rep. 1186 (Ch. 1787), is a good example of such a "remote
and fantastical" possibility. See infra notes 162-63 and accompanying text (discussing Jee).
Of course, the NRTs make some of these events more likely to occur and so less "remote and
fantastical" while simultaneously making some previously impossible events possible, but
remote and fantastical.
81 See, e.g., Haskell, supra note 2, at 548 (common law Rule has produced "massive and
complex body of law dealing with this matter, which is scarcely understood by the bar"); Hess,
supra note 69, at 271 (Rule "suits its task much as did the proverbial sledgehammer used to
kill a fly"); Kadane, supra note 61, at 40 (Rule strikes interests that fail to "meet certain
esoteric standards").
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the Rule may alter its functioning, nothing short of repeal is
ultimately likely to simplify perpetuities issues. 82
How big is this problem? The number of perpetuities opinions in
American courts each year is relatively small,83 a possible indication
that the problem is not large. Reported opinions, however, are not
an adequate index of the importance of the problem. First, many
court opinions are not reported.84 Second, perpetuities cases, when
they are litigated, are often lengthy, complex, expensive, and involve
multiple parties.85  Even a small number of cases can therefore
impose substantial costs and be of great significance. Third, many
cases undoubtedly settle before a final opinion is issued because of
the threat of complete loss of the parties' interest.86 This suggests
that considering only reported cases will undercount the extent of
the problem. Nonetheless, until the advent of the NRTs, perpetu-
ities problems undoubtedly have been less pressing than many other
legal problems and so have received only occasional attention from
state legislatures. The appropriateness of the various reforms has
been the subject of intense debate among a few academics and
lawyers but has generated little interest on the part of the bar at
large and the general public. The widespread impact of the NRTs,
however, threatens to make this inattention potentially costly by
sharply increasing the number of interests that fall afoul of the
Rule.
82 See Bloom, supra note 34 (summarizing debates over various approaches). Specific
proposals have also provoked heated debate. See, e.g., Kadane, supra note 61, at 44-46
(criticizing New York reforms as overly complex and violative of grantor's intent).
83 See Fellows, supra note 16, at 597 (noting that there were sixteen reported cases
dealing with perpetuities between 1984 and 1989); Waggoner, supra note 22, at 580 n.23
(stating that "number of reported appellate cases raising perpetuity claims is not large" but
noting that this may not be adequate measure of problem); Thomas L. Waterbury, Some
Further Thoughts on Perpetuities Reform, 42 MINN. L. REV. 41, 71 n. 109 (1957) (finding "about
100" perpetuities cases in the U.S. between 1945 and 1957).
" John W. Shaw, Principled Interpretations ofState Constitutional Law-Why Don't the
'Primacy'States Practice What They Preach?, 54 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1019, 1035 n.65 (1993).
a See Leach, supra note 22, at 1131.
, See id. at 1132 ("[I]fyou lose, you lose all. It is the rarely courageous lawyer who will
recommend to an otherwise penniless remainderman that he (usually she) fight it out to the
end instead of taking a fifty-fifty offer.').
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II. NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES
All forms of the Rule Against Perpetuities depend on the Rule's
traditional common law logical possibility test for at least part of
their analysis. Under this approach, any living individual is
assumed to be capable of producing children, even at an advanced
age. Thus, many of the circumstances that provoke the most
criticism of the common law Rule turn on improbable pregnancies
among octogenarians and infants."v
The NRTs greatly extend legal problems since they make such
pregnancies not only theoretically possible but actually feasible.
This has two consequences. First, NRTs might lead to more
interests failing under reformed rules like the wait-and-see
approach. Some prior analyses of the Rule's faults that depend on
"the most outrageous cases" being "truly impossible possibilities,"
such as "the possibility that a woman past the menopause will bear
a child," are therefore now incorrect."8 Post-menopausal women are
now capable of bearing children in some circumstances."9 Much
criticism of the famous case of Jee v. Audley, which relied upon such
an "impossibility" to strike interests," is thus no longer valid. Most
importantly, the NRTs offer the opportunity for post-mortem
conception-and that possibility threatens to make void virtually
every future interest involving children and other descendants
subject to the Rule. Second, the "actual period of gestation"s l
provision included within the Rule's limits, so as to protect gifts to
children conceived but not yet born at the time of their parents'
death, could be extended indefinitely for frozen embryos in storage,
thus creating uncertainty about title. In this section we describe the
NRTs.
87 For example, Jee v. Audley turned on the possibility of a pregnancy by a woman more
than seventy years old in 1787. 29 Eng. Rep. 1186 (Ch. 1787). See infra notes 162-63 and
accompanying text (discussing Jee). The inverse case, of a fertile infant, was discussed by W.
Barton Leach in his article, Perpetuities in the Atomic Age: The Sperm Bank and the Fertile
Decedent, 48 A.B.A. J. 942, 942 (1962).
8 Waterbury, supra note 83, at 55 & n.53.
s See, e.g., Mark V. Sauer et al., Pregnancy after Age 50: Application of Qocyte Donation
to Women after Natural Menopause, 341 THE LANCET 321, 321 (1993).
9o 29 Eng. Rep. 1186 (Ch. 1787). See infra notes 162-63 and accompanying text.91 See infra notes 213-15 and accompanying text.
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A. CRYOPRESERVATION OF SEMEN
Cryopreservation is the preservation of biological material, such
as semen, at very low temperatures.92 Semen can be preserved by
freezing for an unlimited amount of time,9 while still ensuring that
sperm remain viable after thawing.94 Consequently, a man might
father a child years, or even decades, after his death. While some
men have semen frozen for purposes of donation to a stranger who
wishes to become pregnant, others freeze semen for their own use
at a later time.95 This may be done in anticipation of fertility-
jeopardizing medical treatment or to insure that a usable sample is
available at the appropriate point during an assisted reproductive
cycle.96 Cryopreservation may be sought for a variety of other
personal reasons as well, including reproduction after death.
Posthumous reproduction can be achieved even in cases where a
man did not store semen prior to his death. Contemporary medical
technology makes it possible for physicians to retrieve sperm from
a deceased male within twenty-four hours of his death. 97 In the
United States, an increasing number of requests for postmortem
sperm retrieval are being made by wives, other family members,
fiancdes, and friends. 98
The issue of posthumous reproduction by a man who had
preserved semen samples was the subject of litigation in the well-
known case of Hecht v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County.99
Prior to committing suicide in October of 1991, William E. Kane
deposited fifteen vials of semen at a semen bank in Los Angeles.'00
92 TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 435 (16th ed. 1989).
93 THE NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY 289, 292 (1998)
[hereinafter TASK FORCE].
94 TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 92, at 435.
95 TASK FORCE, supra note 93, at 289.
w Id. at 289-90.
7 Susan M. Kerr et al., Postmortem Sperm Procurement, 157 J. OF UROLOGY 2154, 2154
(1997).
" Id. at 2155-56. The authors conducted a study that revealed a total of 82 requests
made at 40 facilities in 22 different states in the U.S. between 1980 and 1995. More than half
of the reported requests (43) were made during 1994 and 1995. Of the requests, 25 were
honored at 14 facilities in 12 separate states. Id.
9 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) [hereinafter Hecht 11.
100 Id.
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He stated in both his will and his "Specimen Storage Agreement"
that, in the event of his death, he wished that his semen be released
to his partner, Deborah Hecht, or her personal physician so that
Hecht could become pregnant with his child or children.' °' After
Kane's death, his adult children from a prior marriage petitioned
the court for an order to destroy his stored semen.' 2 Following
several years of litigation, Hecht ultimately obtained release of all
the vials of semen.'03
Several courts have also been called upon to grapple with the
inheritance rights of children conceived from their dead father's
frozen sperm. In 2002, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts considered the inheritance rights of children conceived from
their dead father's frozen sperm.' 4 The court ruled that the
children could inherit if their mother proved the descendant's
paternity and established that he had agreed to reproduce posthu-
mously and to support children that had been conceived from his
sperm.'15 By contrast, that same year, a federal district court in
Arizona held that, under Arizona intestacy laws, children conceived
after their father's death did not "survive" him and could not inherit
under state law.0 6 Most probably, these are only the earliest of
many similar cases that will come before the courts in future
years. 10 7
10 Id. at 276-77.
'02 Id. at 278-79.
" Kane v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 578, 584 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995); Hecht v.
Superior Court, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 222, 228 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) [hereinafter Hecht III. The
court of appeals initially found that the decedent had a property interest in his stored sperm
and that the semen was part of his estate, over which the probate court had jurisdiction.
Hecht 1, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 283. The court further found that California's public policy did
not prohibit the artificial insemination of an unmarried woman or the use of frozen sperm
after the death of the father. Id. at 287, 289. Ms. Hecht was initially awarded three vials of
sperm in accordance with a settlement agreement the parties had signed prior to the
litigation regarding the stored semen, which stated that Hecht would receive 20% of the
estate's assets. Kane, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 580. The court of appeals ultimately decided that
the decedent's sperm was neither an asset of the estate nor subject to division through a
settlement agreement and awarded Hecht the remaining twelve vials. Hecht 11, 59 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 226-28.
' Woodward v. Conm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 257 (Mass. 2002).
10 Id. at 272.
10 Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 231 F. Supp. 2d 961, 966 (D. Ariz. 2002).
107 The Social Security Administration ("SSA") has also grappled with the issue. A case
out of Louisiana involved Social Security survivor benefits for a child that was conceived
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B. CRYOPRESERVATION OF EMBRYOS
The first pregnancy resulting from a frozen embryo was reported
in Australia in 1983.1"' Today, approximately 400,000 frozen
embryos exist in storage facilities in the United States alone."'
Cryopreservation of embryos involves a complex, multi-step
process. First, a sequence of drugs is used to induce the maturation
of multiple follicles so that several eggs, or oocytes, can be retrieved
from the woman."I0 Just prior to ovulation, the eggs are removed in
a minor surgical procedure called ultrasound-guided transvaginal
aspiration."' While an ultrasound transducer provides images of
the reproductive organs, a needle is inserted through the vaginal
wall and into a developed ovarian follicle. 1 2 The fluid inside the
follicle is withdrawn together with the egg it contains, and the
through artificial insemination after her father's death. Girl Conceived after Dad Died Gets
Benefits; Social Security Ruling Applies Only to This Case, CFI. TRIB., Mar. 12, 1996, at 12.
The Social Security Act defines the term "child," in relevant part as "the child or legally
adopted child of an individual." 42 U.S.C. § 416(e)(1) (2000). SSA initially maintained that
the child was not eligible for benefits because Louisiana law did not recognize children
conceived after their fathers' deaths as heirs. Joseph Wharton, Social Security Case Settled,
82 A.B.A. J. 40, 40 (May 1996). State laws concerning inheritance rights govern such
questions. Id. The Social Security Act provides that "[i]n determining whether an applicant
is the child ... of a fully or currently insured individual ... the Commissioner of Social
Security shall apply such law as would be applied in determining the devolution of intestate
personal property by the courts of the State in which such insured individual is
domiciled...." 42 U.S.C. § 416(hX2XA) (2000). A previous case involved an Arizona child,
but since Arizona law recognized a child conceived posthumously through artificial
insemination as the deceased father's heir, there was no dispute regarding the child's right
to Social Security survivor benefits. Girl Conceived, supra, at 12. An administrative law
judge later found that the Louisiana child was entitled to benefits, but a Social Security
appeals panel overturned the ruling. Id. The child's mother filed suit in federal court,
inducing SSA to reconsider its position. Wharton, supra, at 40. Ultimately, SSA decided to
pay the child $700 a month in benefits but emphasized that the decision applied only to the
case before it and that broad changes in the law might be needed as a consequence of new
reproductive technologies. Girl Conceived, supra, at 12.
108 Alan Trounson & Linda Mohr, Human Pregnancy Following Cryopreservation,
Thawing and Transfer ofan Eight-Cell Embryo, 305 NATURE 707,707 (1983). The pregnancy,
however, ended unsuccessfully when the fetus was stillborn during the twenty-fourth week
of gestation. Id.
109 Rick Weiss, 400,000 Human Embryos Frozen in U.S.; Number at Fertility Clinics Is
Far Greater Than Previous Estimates, Survey Finds, WASH. POST, May 8, 2003, at A10.
"0 TASK FORCE, supra note 93, at 53.
. Id. at 54.
112 Id.
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procedure is repeated for each follicle, utilizing the initial vaginal
puncture.1
13
After retrieval, eggs are examined in the laboratory to determine
their level of maturity and optimal time for fertilization." 4 The
oocytes are then placed in a tissue-culture medium where they
remain undisturbed for two to twenty-four hours prior to fertiliza-
tion." '
Semen is obtained from the male partner and is processed so that
a concentrated sample can be introduced into individual culture
dishes, each containing medium and one egg." 6 After a day, the
oocyte is examined to determine whether fertilization has occurred,
and, if it has, the cell is an embryo, and it is stored in a nutrient
culture medium that is placed in a warm incubator." 7
Embryos are frozen on the second or third day after oocyte
retrieval,.when they have divided into four to eight cells." 8 Prior to
freezing, the cells' liquid interior is replaced with a cryoprotectant
solution so that the embryos are protected from the formation of
damaging ice crystals." 9 Embryos are then placed in straws that
contain a very small amount of fluid and are slowly frozen, using
computerized machines. 120 The straws are stored in canisters that
are kept frozen with liquid nitrogen.' 2' Prior to implantation, the
storage straws are gradually warmed, the cryoprotectants are
removed, and the embryos are cultured for about a day. 12
By some estimates, contemporary technology would allow for the
safe storage of embryos for fifty years or longer. 123 Consequently,
"a Id.
114 Id. at 56.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 57.
119 Id. at 81. Most storage facilities currently use propanediol as a cryoprotectant.
GEOFFREY SliER ET AL., IN VITRO FERTILIZATION 170 (1995).
m TASK FORCE, supra note 93, at 81.
121 Id.
122 id.
' Peter R. Brinsden et al., Frozen Embryos: Decision Time in the U.K, 10 HUMAN
REPRODUCTION 3083,3084 (1995). In the United States, many facilities specify a two- to five-
year storage period, providing the couple an option to extend the time period with mutual
written consent. TASK FORCE, supra note 93, at 293. In Australia, many programs impose
a ten-year limit on embryo storage, after which a couple must agree to the disposition of any
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children could be born many decades after one or both of their
genetic parents died.
C. CRYOPRESERVATION OF OVUM
Cryopreservation of mature, unfertilized eggs is not standard
clinical practice at the present time.'24 The mature egg's high liquid
content and size make it particularly difficult to freeze, and sperm
have generally proven unable to penetrate previously frozen and
thawed oocytes.' 25
Nevertheless, ovum cryopreservation is a developing reproductive
technology that has already proven successful in isolated
instances. 26 At one clinic in Italy, four of twelve frozen oocytes
survived thawing, two were successfully fertilized, and one devel-
oped into a healthy baby after the embryo was transferred to the
mother's womb.'27 In the United States, a fertility clinic in Georgia
also achieved success utilizing frozen oocytes. '28 Sixteen of twenty-
three eggs that had been frozen for twenty-five months appeared
undamaged upon thawing, eleven were fertilized, four were
transferred to the mother, and a twin pregnancy resulted.
12 9
unused embryos, or the matter is decided by an institutional ethics committee. Douglas M.
Saunders et al., Frozen Embryos: Too Cold to Touch? The Dilemma Ten Years On, 10 HUMAN
REPRODUCTION 3081, 3081 (1995). In England, a 1991 law dictated a five-year limit on
embryo storage and prohibited cryopreservation ofembryos unless couples agreed in advance
to the destruction of unused embryos after this period. Brinsden, supra at 3083. See R.G.
Edwards & Helen K. Beard, Destruction of Cryopreserved Embryos: UK Law Dictated the
Destruction of 3000 Cryopreserved Human Embryos, 12 HUMAN REPRODUCTION 3, 3 (1997)
(stating that because of Act, 3000 embryos would be destroyed unless parents made formal
request for extension). In May of 1996, the law was amended to allow couples who created
embryos to obtain a five-year extension of the storage period, but British fertility clinics
nonetheless destroyed approximately 3,300 embryos for which no one requested extended
cryopreservation. TASK FORCE, supra note 93, at 293; Youssef M. Ibrahim, Ethical Furor
Erupts in Britain: Should Embryos Be Destroyed?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1996, at Al.
124 See TASKFORCE, supra note 93, at 83 (noting difficulties encountered in cryopreserva-
tion of mature eggs).
12 Id.
SHERETAL., supra note 119, at 171.
12 Eleonora Porcu et al. , Birth ofa Healthy Female after Intracytoplasmic Sperm Injection
of Cryopreserved Human Oocytes, 68 FERTILITY AND STERILITY 724 (1997).
m Gina Kolata, Successful Births Reported with Frozen Human Eggs, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
17, 1997, at Al, A26.
m Id. at A26. The procedure was facilitated by a new technique that allows doctors to
inject sperm directly into the thawed eggs. Id.
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Research is also being conducted regarding postmortem retrieval of
immature oocytes or entire sections of an ovary from a deceased
woman. 
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Some predict that in the future, ovum preservation combined
with semen freezing might replace the cryopreservation of
embryos.' 31 After fertilization, the embryos could be implanted
either in the egg donor or in another woman. Consequently, the
freezing of eggs, like frozen embryo storage, could lead to the birth
of children long after one or both genetic parents are dead.
D. CLONING
Cloning is yet another reproductive technology that could enable
individuals to reproduce posthumously. Posthumous cloning would
be achieved by inserting the nucleus of a preserved somatic cell 3 2
from a deceased individual into an egg that has had its nucleus
removed. 133 The egg would then develop into an embryo whose
genetic makeup would be nearly identical to that of the deceased. 134
Cloning is the most controversial of the new reproductive
technologies. In 1997, two Scottish researchers, Ian Wilmut and
Keith Campbell, cloned a sheep.3 5 Since then, researchers have
refined cloning techniques, and in January 2002, Texas A & M
University announced the birth of the first cloned household pet, a
cat.16 Scientists have also begun experimenting with the cloning of
130 TASKFORCE, supra note 93, at 265 n.207.
131 SHER ET AL., supra note 119, at 174. Freezing sperm and eggs separately might be
preferable to freezing embryos because of moral and ethical considerations. Currently,
doctors, donors, and storage facilities often face difficult decisions regarding the destruction
of stored embryos that are deemed by some to constitute human lives. The destruction of
cryopreserved gametes that have not been joined to form an embryo does not involve the same
ethical dilemmas. Id. at 173.
132 A somatic cell is a cell other than a sperm or an egg. TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL
DICTIONARY, supra note 92, at 1704.
133 TASK FORCE, supra note 93, at 390-91.
134 Id. While almost all DNA is contained in the cell's nucleus, some is contained in the
cytoplasm, the cell matter outside the nucleus. TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY,
supra note 92, at 452. The cytoplasmic DNA would not be transferred to the embryo. TASK
FORCE, supra note 93, at 390.
" See Ian Wilmut et al., Viable Offspring Derived from Fetal and Adult Mammalian
Cells, 385 NATURE 810, 810 (1997) (explaining science behind cloning sheep).
'" Carol Monaghan, Cloning Kitty: A Copycat of a Different Stripe, CIn. TRIB., Feb. 26,
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early-stage human embryos. 13 7 Although human cloning has proven
controversial, and its ultimate success in producing a living being
has yet to be demonstrated, Congress1 3 8 and many state
legislatures'39 have repeatedly considered bans on human cloning.
Laws prohibiting the creation of human beings through cloning have
been enacted in California, Louisiana, Michigan, and Rhode
Island.140 In addition, President William Clinton issued an execu-
tive directive banning federal funding for human cloning research, 41
a ban President George W. Bush supported after taking office. 142
Despite the early outcry against the idea of human cloning, 3
cloning may well become an accepted reproductive technology in the
future."" Indeed, some commentators view it as inevitable. 145
Cloning would allow either a male or a female of any age to
reproduce by preserving some body tissue. 46 The nucleus from one
of the individual's somatic cells would later be transferred to an
2002, at 10.
137 See Cibelli, supra note 8, at 45. The scientists hope to develop human embryos for
therapeutic rather than reproductive purposes.
13 See, e.g., Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 2003, H.R. 534, 108th Cong. (2003); Ban
on Human Cloning Act, H.R. 1260, 107th Cong. (2001); Human Cloning Prohibition Act of
2001, H.R. 2505, H.R. 1644, H.R. 1608, S. 790, and S. 704, 107th Cong. (2001); Cloning
Prohibition Act of 2001, H.R. 2608, H.R. 2172, 107th Cong. (2001).
139 Lori B. Andrews & Nanette Elster, Regulating Reproductive Technologies, 21 J. LEGAL
MED. 35, 43 (2000).
140 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24185 (West Supp. 2000); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
40:1299.36.2 (West Supp. 2001); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.430a (West Supp. 1999); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 23-16.4 (Supp. 1999).
' Lori B. Andrews, Is There A Right to Clone? Constitutional Challenges to Bans on
Human Cloning, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 643, 644 (1998).
142 August Gribbin, Bush Voices Intense Opposition to Human Cloning, WASH. TIMES, Mar.
29, 2001, at Al.
143 Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Israel, Japan,
Norway, Peru, Slovakia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom
either have laws against human cloning or have announced plans to pass such laws. See F.
JAMES SENSENBRENNER, HUMAN CLONING PROHIBITION ACT OF 2003, H.R. REP. No. 108-18,
at 3 (2003) (discussing countries and organizations that have banned or have called to ban
cloning of human beings).
144 TASKFORCE, supra note 93, at 395-96. While some commentators believe that human
cloning would be unethical in all circumstances, others feel that it would be ethically
acceptable so long as the procedure was safe. Id.
145 See, e.g., Robin McKie, Dolly Dies-But Human Cloning Will Still Happen, OBSERVER,
Feb. 16, 2003 ("'It now seems inevitable that human clones will be born somewhere in the
world,' said cloning expert Dr. Patrick Dixon."), available at http://observer.guardian.co.uk/
uk-news/story/0,6903,896566,00.html.
14 Andrews, supra note 141, at 647-48.
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enucleated egg cell to form an embryo.147 The somatic cell provider
may be unrelated to the egg donor and the gestational mother, and
thus three different individuals may biologically contribute to the
birth of the child. 4 ' Cloning could occur long after the somatic cell
donor and the egg donor die and is therefore an additional technol-
ogy that could be used for posthumous reproduction.
E. SUMMARY
Advances in reproductive technology are an established part of
the medical landscape. No longer merely the subject of speculative
fiction, new reproductive technologies become more widely available
each year. As these technologies become widespread, the law will
need to recognize their existence and consider their impact on
existing legal rules and institutions. Much as family law earlier
evolved to include children who were adopted or born out of wedlock
within the legal definition of children,'49 so too will property law
need to address the reality of posthumously conceived children.
Since at least some of these children will be "planned" posthumous
births, as in the Hecht case discussed above, 5 ' simply excluding all
such children as heirs by definition, as was done with those born out
of wedlock in earlier times,'51 is unacceptable. We assume, there-
fore, that posthumous conception and birth of children is inevitable
and that such children will ultimately have to be treated as the legal
children of their genetic parents, at least where the children's
conception is planned.
147 TASK FORCE, supra note 93, at 391.
'48 See Andrews & Elster, supra note 139, at 64.
149 See Harry D. Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, 65 MICH. L. REV. 477
passim (1967) (discussing legal discrimination against illegitimate children); Walter
Wadlington,Artificial Conception: The Challenge for Family Law, 69 VA. L. REv. 466,483-97
(1983) (discussing family law issues raised by NRTs); Charles Nelson le Ray, Note,
Implications Of DNA Technology On Posthumous Paternity Determination: Deciding The
Facts When Daddy Can't Give His Opinion, 35 B.C. L. REV. 747, 794-95 (1994) (discussing
implications of posthumous genetic testing for paternity and concluding that "[the modern
trend is to allow posthumous actions, with proof by clear and convincing evidence").
'60 See supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
'5' See Krause, supra note 149, at 477-82 (discussing legislation that disfavored
illegitimate children).
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III. ACCOMMODATING THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES
Perhaps not surprisingly, given that the law has not quite
resolved some of the legal issues surrounding "old fashioned"
artificial insemination,'52 the NRTs pose significant problems for all
forms of the Rule. 5 ' As perpetuities expert Professor Robert
Fletcher noted, these technologies, "if recognized by the Rule, would
create havoc with its mechanics."154 Fletcher quickly dismissed the
possibility of such recognition in 1988, noting that "as far as we
know, no court has allowed a challenge posing delayed or 'test-tube'
births, and there seems little likelihood that any will."'55 However,
by changing the biology of reproduction significantly, the NRTs call
into question even the most fundamental analysis under the Rule. 156
We consider here only the most straightforward problem introduced
by the NRTs: posthumously-conceived children. Complications
created by a child having more than two parents, for example, are
ignored.
15 7
A. THE BASIC PROBLEM
Consider the following bequest and the common law RAP.
Example 1: T leaves Blackacre "to my grandchildren
who shall reach the age of 21."
"2 Ralph C. Brashier, Children and Inheritance in the Nontraditional Family, 1996 UTAH
L. REV. 93, 102 (1996).
" The NRTs require accommodation by the law in other areas as well: Are posthumously
conceived children legitimate? Who gets to decide if the preserved genetic material can be
used to procreate? See, e.g., E. Donald Shapiro & Benedene Sonnenblick, The Widow and the
Sperm: The Law of Post-Mortem Insemination, 1 J. HEALTH L. 229, 229 (1987) (discussing
legal issues surrounding posthumous conception).
154 Fletcher, supra note 4, at 803.
15 Id.
1" See, e.g., Dukeminier, supra note 3, at 1663 n.44 (ruling out considering sexual
partners-present or future-because partners "cannot beget any children of A after A's
death" and ruling out, without explanation, use of NRTs).
1.57 E. Donald Shapiro, New Innovations in Conception and Their Effects Upon Our Law
and Morality, 31 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 37, 54 (1986) (noting possibility of children having up
to five parents through use of NRTs: "an egg donor, a sperm donor, a woman who provides
a womb for all or part of gestation, and the couple who rears the child").
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In Professor Barton Leach's classic article Perpetuities in a
Nutshell, this bequest is given as an example of an interest valid
under the common law Rule. The gift is valid, according to Profes-
sor Leach, "since all grandchildren must be born in the lives of the
testator's (T's) children and these must perforce be lives in being at
T's death."' Suppose, however, that T has left cryopreserved
semen in a sperm bank.'59 Since it is logically possible that T will
then have children who are born years later, T's children can no
longer serve as the measuring lives. Recall, the common law Rule
is a rule of logical possibility-as the "fertile octogenarian" problem
demonstrates, 6 ° the technology need not even exist to make the
birth of a child realistically possible for the Rule to strike down an
interest.' 6 ' In the (in)famous 1787 case of Jee v. Audley,6 2 Sir Lord
Kenyon rejected the claim that seventy year-old John and Elizabeth
Jee could be presumed not to be capable of further offspring, noting
that if such a presumption could be made "in one case it may in
another, and it is a very dangerous experiment, and introductive of
the greatest inconvenience to give a latitude to such sort of conjec-
ture.' 63
Despite the long history of convoluted and even bizarre factual
analyses relied on by courts in applying the Rule, one might argue
that the problem of preserved semen, eggs, and embryos could be
dealt with in most cases by a court's finding that no cryopreserved
semen, eggs, or embryos existed for a particular testator. However,
it will be difficult for parties to prove conclusively that a particular
testator did not leave cryopreserved genetic material or embryos
and thereby to persuade a court to reject application of the Rule to
a given interest.'16 For example, donating semen may not generate
W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 HARv. L. REV. 638, 641 (1938).
"6 There are significant legal questions relating to whether frozen sperm deposited at a
sperm bank is inheritable or devisable. Brashier, supra note 152, at 210-11.
160 See infra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
161 Professor Robert Lynn argued in 1964 that "the possibility of a posthumous child
conceived by artificial insemination after the death of the donor husband is a fantastic one,
judged by ordinary standards" and therefore should not be a basis for challenging an interest.
Robert J. Lynn, Raising the Perpetuities Question: Conception, Adoption, "Wait and See," and
Cy Pres, 17 VAND. L. REV. 1391, 1396 (1964). The possibility is certainly less fantastic today.
12 29 Eng. Rep. 1186 (Ch. 1787).
1'6 Id. at 1187.
16 Lest the reader think that courts are going to pay close attention to whether or not
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a medical record that would be found by a standard medical history
search. Similarly, individuals might have embryos stored in
another country where they previously lived. Thus, proving the
negative proposition that the deceased never arranged for the
cryopreservation of genetic material is virtually impossible.
Consequently, courts may have to strike many more interests than
if the Rule required positive proof of cryopreservation. Indeed,
while the use of this technology is relatively rare in the general
population at this time, it might become widespread among the
wealthy in a relatively short time. Even as an empirical matter,
therefore, courts may not long be justified in ignoring the possibility
of posthumously conceived children. The first class of problems
presented by the NRTs is, therefore, that some interests that
previously passed the common law Rule (and hence the other
versions of the Rule which incorporate it as well) no longer do so
once the NRTs are considered.
B. OPPORTUNITIES FOR FRAUD
The second class of problems created by the NRTs is that there
are enhanced opportunities for fraud and other forms of unethical
behavior that affect the disposition of testators' estates. Even if
courts were willing to assume that a particular testator had not left
cryopreserved genetic material behind, in the absence of conclusive
proof that he or she had, this would not eliminate the problem.
Consider the following hypothetical:
people actually leave preserved genetic material behind, consider the fertile octogenarian
case, Jee v. Audley, 29 Eng. Rep. 1186. Only one American court had rejected the Jee
presumption of fertility even at an advanced age as of 1983, according to Professor
Waggoner's research, and we have found none since. Waggoner, supra note 3, at 1729-30.
Professor Waggoner concluded that making the presumption rebuttable would be insufficient
to solve the problem because
it could seldom be sufficiently rebutted to save a perpetuity violation as
long as the requirement of initial certainty remains the test for validity.
The most that could be established in most cases would be that it was
unlikely, indeed perhaps even extremely unlikely, that the person in
question could have more children.
Id. at 1731. Although Waggoner attributes this to the possibility of adoption, posthumously
conceived children present the same issues. Id. at 1731.
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Example 2: T, a wealthy man, falls ill without having
provided for any cryopreserved semen. He dies and is
survived by his second wife (W2) and two children from
a prior marriage (Cl and C2), and leaves a will that
makes the following bequests:
1. I leave Blackacre to my wife, W2, for life and then to
my children.
2. I leave $1,000,000 to be divided equally among all my
children.
3. I leave all the rest, residue and remainder of my
estate to my wife, W2.
W2 is at T's side during his last moments and, shortly
before he dies,16 W2 instructs a physician in her employ
to collect semen from T and cryopreserve it.
Even if a court were willing to assume that T left no
cryopreserved semen without conclusive proof, and even if T had
never showed any interest in cryopreserving his semen, W2 will be
able to prove conclusively that cryopreserved semen existed at the
time the interests were created.'" The existence of the
cryopreserved semen would mean that the bequest of the remainder
to C1 and C2 would be stricken, and the remainder would then pass
under clause 3 of the will and go to W2.' In short, a powerful
166 The semen could also be collected after 's death. See supra notes 97-98 and
accompanying text. However, this could pose problems because the common law Rule
requires evaluating the possibilities at the time the interest is created. Fletcher, supra note
4, at 793 (noting that Rule tests interests at effective date of instrument creating interest).
In the case of a will, this would be the time of the testator's death, and by definition, no
children could have been conceived using posthumously collected semen before the testator's
death. In the case of a bequest by T "to all of A's children," one which would be otherwise
valid under the common law Rule, posthumous collection of A's semen would have to be
considered, and even more bequests would therefore be invalid.
'66 C1 and C2 cannot, therefore, successfully argue (at least without obtaining a
significant judicial modification of the Rule) that it is not possible that a child will be born to
T and W2 at some time in the future because C1 and C2 will sue to obtain possession of the
cryopreserved semen and then destroy it and so foreclose the possibility of W2 making use
of the semen. It is possible that W2 will prevail in such a suit and, as a rule of logical
possibility, therefore, the Rule should then apply.
"6 Cl and C2's share of the $1,000,000 under clause 2 could also be in trouble in a
jurisdiction that did not apply the "rule of convenience" to class gifts, since the class of
potential takers would now be open. This is so because in a gift to a class, if the interest of
one member of the class does not vest, none of the interests are vested for purposes of the
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economic incentive would exist for W2 to ensure that T's semen was
collected and cryopreserved, even if she never intended to bear
children using the semen. By her action, W2 would be able to alter
significantly the disposition of T's estate without his consent, a
troubling development.16
In this example, T could take some steps to protect his estate
plan. If T replaced the class gift of the remainder and the
$1,000,000 with specific bequests to named children, he would avoid
the problem. Such a course of action sacrifices the advantages of
class gifts (i.e., T must amend his will after each child is born or risk
leaving a child unprovided for by dying before amending the will to
include that child.) but, for individuals with large estates such as T,
this may not represent a significant inconvenience. The issue is not
if one can write a will that gets around the problem, however, but
whether people writing wills will in fact do so. Given the elementary
perpetuities mistakes that already occur when writing wills, adding
an additional contingency to consider is likely to produce additional
errors.
Moreover, the NRTs also increase the chance of fraud. W2 in
Example 2, for example, might collude with a lawyer to ensure that
the will is written as in the example rather than without the class
gift language. Since even lawyers sometimes fail to appreciate
perpetuities issues, the chance of T appreciating the difference
between a class gift and a gift to named heirs, especially when
shown a will that appears to carry out his wishes exactly, are
relatively slight. Thus, even in a straightforward case, such as this
example, the NRTs pose a significant problem for the common law
Rule.
C. REDUCING THE SET OF VALID INTERESTS
The third class of problems created by the NRTs is that they
reduce the set of possible and/or desirable solutions available to
Rule. LYNN, supra note 22, at 91. Various "class closing" rules, such as the "rule of
convenience," mitigate this somewhat. Id. at 91-95. For an explanation of the "rule of
convenience" see infra notes 198-99 and accompanying text.
"' Lynn suggests that courts simply refuse to recognize such children in similar
circumstances. Lynn, supra note 161, at 1396.
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either courts or drafters of instruments to solve other perpetuities
problems. For example, the existence of the NRTs transforms many
previously solvable perpetuities problems into versions of the "fertile
octogenarian" type. Professor Leach set out the classic example of
this problem in his 1938 article as follows:
Example 3: "T has a widowed sister, A, aged 80. He
leaves property in trust to pay the income to A for life,
then to pay the income to the children of A for their
lives, then to pay the principal to the children of such
children."169
The gift of the principal fails under the common law Rule because
"the children of A include after-born children and A is conclusively
presumed to be capable of having children until death."7 '
The fertile octogenarian "problem" is, at least in part, a problem
of drafting rather than simply a problem of interpretation. In
Example 3 above, T could simply have made the final portion of the
gift to "the children of such children alive at the time of creation of
the interest."'7' The italicized words would save the gift, at the cost
of excluding A's grandchildren born of A's afterborn children.
Without the NRTs, it seems safe to conclude, as some have, that
it would "be the rare transferor who would protest that the change
thwarts the intent."72 This is particularly true because without the
NRTs, the grandchildren of A born of A's afterborn children are
unlikely to exist. With the NRTs, however, the size of this class of
potential grandchildren is expanded, making such drafting solutions
at least marginally less desirable to transferors. The existence of
the NRTs means that not only are octogenarians of both sexes
presumed fertile, some of them actually are fertile. In addition,
NRTs have the potential to make many deceased individuals fertile,
or at least more likely to be fertile than a female octogenarian in
1938 or 1787 was. 173
16 Leach, supra note 158, at 643.
'7 Id. Leach calls this result plainly silly. Id.
171 See Kadane, supra note 61, at 42 (suggesting such language).
172 Id.
... There is a further subset of the fertile octogenarian problem: the "precocious toddler,"
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One solution to the fertile octogenarian problem generally is the
adoption of a constructional preference for validity: "[Where [an
instrument] is fairly susceptible to two or more constructions, one
of which causes a Rule violation and the other of which does
not-the construction that does not result in a Rule violation should
be adopted."174 This principle can be used in fertile octogenarian
cases to support a holding by a court
that the possibility of future children being born to or
adopted by the person in question was so remote that
the transferor never contemplated it and so did not
intend to include such children in the class gift language
even if they ultimately materialized. So construed, the
requirement of initial certainty is met, and the interest
is valid.
175
The problem with this solution is that the NRTs increase the
probability of future children, making it less likely that the
possibility of future children is indeed remote. Not only is it more
likely (at least marginally) that any given individual will have more
children in the future as the NRTs become available, but the NRTs
also make it more difficult for third parties to evaluate how likely
any individual is to have a child in the future by removing the most
easily independently observed proxy for child bearing-age-as a
means of excluding future children. John and Elizabeth Jee might
not have been capable of actually having more children barring a
miracle in 1787; today, their chances would be markedly greater.
in which young children are also presumed capable of reproduction. Leach, supra note 34,
at 992 (citing Re Gaite's Will Trusts, 1 All E.R. 459 (1949)); Leach, supra note 4, at 732-33
(discussing same case). Cloning, at least, makes this more likely. See, e.g., Brian Alexander,
(You)2, WIRED (Feb. 2001), available at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/9/02/projectx.
html (describing potential attempts by parents to recreate dead child through cloning).
174 Waggoner, supra note 3, at 1732.
175 Id. at 1733. See also LYNN, supra note 22, at 67 (arguing" 'children whenever born to
B A's widow] irrespective of the time of conception' is not a construction within the presumed
intention of the testator in the ordinary case, and should be rejected"). Notably, Lynn does
not cite any evidence to support his claim, which was undoubtedly true in 1966 but is
becoming less so as the NRTs become more common.
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D. INADVERTENT VIOLATIONS
The fourth class of problems created by the NRTs is that they
increase the number of inadvertent violations of the Rule: "A
conspicuous feature of the common law rule ... is the ease with
which it can be violated unwittingly. Conversely, as we have seen,
a draftsman who is wise in the ways of the rule can not only stay
within permitted bounds, but manipulate those bounds to a
considerable degree."'7 6 The Rule is thus more likely to harm the
client of the inexperienced practitioner than the client attempting
to exercise dead hand control with the aid of a sophisticated lawyer.
The preposterousness of the probabilities under which the NRTs
lead to invalidity means these conditions are unlikely to occur to
nonspecialists and are unlikely to be remedied by careful drafting
of wills and other instruments.
As these examples illustrate, the existence of NRTs can result in
many interests being vulnerable to challenges under any of the
versions of the Rule in force today. Reform of the Rule to address
these problems is therefore necessary.
E. INADEQUACIES OF THE CURRENT ALTERNATIVES
The three major types of reform of the common law Rule do not
resolve the problems created by the NRTs for the common law
Rule. 7 7 The wait-and-see reform is dependent upon the common
law Rule, as its second step applies only when an interest fails the
common law Rule. While the wait-and-see Rule saves some
interests that fail the common law Rule, it does not alter which
176 Waterbury, supra note 83, at 58.
77 But see Kathleen R. Guzman, Property, Progeny, Body Part: Assisted Reproduction and
the Transfer of Wealth, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 193,221-22 (1997) ("{Eixtending [wait-and-see
and cy pres] to assisted reproduction requires little stretch."). There are many other
questions raised by the NRTs. We have been describing voluntary gifts and bequests, but at
least one commentator has suggested that a sperm donor's estate might have mandatory
obligations toward posthumously conceived children. Brashier, supra note 152, at 211-12.
Resolution of this problem is linked to the issues we raise, since it would be hard to reconcile
an inconsistent approach that, for example, held that voluntary gifts to children conceived
before death were void because a posthumously conceived hypothetical child might share it,
with a rule that posthumously conceived children must inherit through intestacy and forced
share laws.
[Vol. 38:575608
20041 RAP & NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES
interests pass the initial common law Rule test and so does not solve
the problems caused by the NRTs for the common law Rule. For
those interests it saves, the wait-and-see Rule requires actually
waiting out a period up to lives in being plus twenty-one years to
learn if the interest has actually vested. Such a period could
amount to one hundred years or more. The fact that an increased
number of interests fail the common law Rule means that more
interests will be in legal limbo during the potentially lengthy
waiting period designated by the wait-and-see Rule's second step.
As NRTs become common enough to be understood by courts,
their impact will be to expand the number of interests subject to the
second step. The NRTs also diminish the utility of the wait-and-see
reform because they increase the number of instances in which it is
necessary to actually wait and see. Consider the following:
Example 4: A devises Blackacre "to B for life, remainder
to that child born to (not adopted by) B who first attains
age 25," where B is a woman who survives A, is child-
less, and is incapable of conceiving and bearing a
child. 178
Without considering the NRTs, Prof. Robert Lynn analyzed this
devise under a wait-and-see Rule and concluded that "a declaration
of failure of the contingent remainder [in B's child] is permissible on
A's death."179 As Prof. Lynn acknowledged in a footnote to his
analysis, however, "[aldoption, freezing sperm, in vitro fertilization,
and surrogate motherhood have complicated" the law. 8 1 Although
Professor Lynn resolved the issue by assuming the problem away,
the existence of the NRTs at least reduces the number of cases in
which a factual determination that conception is impossible can be
reached, thus making the need to wait and see more prevalent. The
structure of the wait-and-see Rule will thus lead to considerable
uncertainty over the validity of these interests during the waiting
period.
17' Example taken from Lynn, supra note 34, at 237.
179 Lynn, supra note 34, at 237.
'80 Id. at 237 n.42.
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Moreover, there is an important problem with the wait-and-see
approach that is aggravated by the NRTs. Recall that the common
law Rule applies as a matter of logic. If an interest fails the
common law Rule because of a potential "unborn widow " 18 1 or
afterborn child, the wait-and-see Rule simply requires waiting to see
whether the interest actually vests within the perpetuities period.
In many cases, this is sufficient to deal with low probability events.
In some cases, however, identifying the measuring lives for purposes
of determining how long to wait is a problem.
In general, wait-and-see Rules require either that the measuring
lives have a reasonable relationship to the future interest in
question or a causal relationship to the vesting or failure of the
interest.182 As Professor Paul Haskell has noted, however, these
attempts at clarification still leave substantial uncertainty about
just who the measuring lives are.18  The NRTs complicate this
analysis further by making possible additional births after the death
of individuals involved. Consider this example provided by Haskell:
Example 5: "Assume testator bequeaths $100,000 to the
grandchildren of A who reach age twenty-one. At testa-
tor's death, A, two children of A, and three grandchil-
dren of A are living, but no grandchild has reached
twenty-one."" 4
Haskell notes that interests of the grandchildren are void under the
common law Rule "because of the possibility of afterborn children of
A whose children could take beyond the period of the Rule."8 5
"" The "unborn widow" problem arises in testamentary gifts such as "to A for life, then
to his widow for life, and then to A's children then living." Since the woman who will be A's
widow cannot be identified until A's death, the widow might turn out to be someone unborn
at T's death and thus not a life-in-being under the Rule. Because A's children's interests will
not vest until the widow's death, the possibility exists that the widow will both have been
unborn at Ts death and outlive A by more than twenty-one years, and this voids the gift to
A's children.
1" Haskell, supra note 2, at 551-52.
183 Id. at 553-54.
184 Id. at 552.
18 Id.
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Under a wait-and-see approach, the measuring lives to be
considered include A, A's children, and A's grandchildren alive at
the testator's death.18 The other parent of the living children of A
and the parents of the living grandchildren of A other than the
children of A are not generally considered measuring lives under the
wait-and-see approach "because they are redundant-after the
deaths of their respective spouses they cannot affect the identity of
the grandchildren who take."1 87 Unfortunately, even if the wait-and-
see Rule were clear on this point absent the existence of the NRTs,
once the NRTs are in existence, it is difficult to see how those
additional lives can be treated as redundant."8 8 The death of John
no longer means that Mary cannot bear John's children. Therefore,
the NRTs complicate the wait-and-see Rule's already complex
measuring lives problem by increasing substantially the number of
lives that must end before one can determine if the Rule has been
violated.189
The cy pres approach is also inadequate to deal with the prob-
lems posed by the NRTs. Recall that to apply cy pres requires the
courts to identify the interests that fail a version of the perpetuities
rule. 90 The NRTs' impact on expanding the class of interests that
fail the perpetuities rule (either in its original form or in a revised
form) is thus not diminished by granting courts the power to engage
'86 "A is a measuring life because he may have a child who may have a child who may
take; A's children are measuring lives because they may have children who may take; A's
grandchildren are measuring lives because they may take." Id. at 552-53.
187 Id. at 553. Haskell uses this example as part of a discussion of why the measuring
lives provision is unclear even on the wait-and-see approach's own terms. Id. We do not
mean to suggest he is advocating this particular approach. See also Jesse Dukeminier, Wait
and See: The Causal Relationship Principle, 102 L. Q. REV. 250, 257 (1986) (noting that
nothing can be proven by A's spouse that cannot also be proven by A).
'88 In one respect, the NRTs make the wait-and-see rule simpler to apply. Haskell raises
the question of whether measuring lives should be treated as if the individuals in question
"'died' when they become infertile." Haskell, supra note 2, at 553. Since, in the world of
NRTs, no one becomes conclusively infertile before death, and some remain fertile even after
death, that concern is eliminated by the existence of the NRTs.
189 Of course, one might secure affidavits or testimony from the individuals involved that
no vials of cryopreserved semen, frozen embryos, or cryopreserved eggs exist to demonstrate
that it is not necessary to wait to see if a particular life ended. Proving a negative is much
harder than proving a positive, however, and much more expensive. Moreover, the issue is
not merely whether the Rule will strike an interest but whether the potential for such an
action raises the transactions costs of using the asset.
190 See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
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in reformation of interests. The NRTs will therefore still vastly
expand the number of interests failing the perpetuities rule.
Under a cy pres approach, the courts will be called upon to alter
those interests to a form that approximates the donor's intent and
complies with the perpetuities rule. But because the NRTs expand
the proportion of interests that fail the perpetuities rule, courts will
have more interests to reform, and they will have fewer interests
that pass the perpetuities rule available as options to reform the
invalid interests. Increasing the constraints on courts will also
result in a reduced ability to approximate the donor's intent. The
consequences of the NRTs for the cy pres reform are thus particu-
larly serious. More interests will have to be reformed, the reforma-
tions will be less able to approximate the donor's intent,'9 ' and the
courts will have fewer options available to them to use in reforming
the interests. Courts could, of course, simply use their cy pres
powers to imply a restriction excluding posthumously conceived or
born children who are born more than twenty-one years after the
birth of the last measuring life, a restriction that would surely
exclude mostly children for whom testators did not intend to make
provisions. Doing so now, while the NRTs remain experimental and
relatively rare, would be unlikely to have too many adverse
consequences. As the NRTs become more widely available, however,
it will require more widespread use of cy pres powers than currently
accepted by the courts. We therefore prefer an explicit solution
adopted legislatively, as described below.
The USRAP offers the apparent simplicity of an explicit provision
rejecting the possibility of children born after death using an
NRT.'92 This provision prevents the NRTs from expanding the class
of interests that fail the common law RAP and eliminates the need
to consider the possibility of an impact of the NRTs in reforming an
191 One question is what donor intent is likely to be with respect to posthumous children.
Given that the NRTs are new, we do not yet have the societal experience with respect to this
issue to be able to construct a majoritarian default rule or even for it to be likely that
individuals storing genetic material have completely addressed their intentions with respect
to the material. Over time, such experience is likely to arise and allow courts to do a better
job of predicting donor intent, or at least to construct rules that provide reasonable default
rules.
'" USRAP, supra note 49, § 1(d), at 985.
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interest. 9 3 Indeed, the USRAP manages to invert the common law
Rule's fertile octogenarian problem. Under the common law before
the advent of the NRTs, logical possibility trumped physical
probability. Under the USRAP, after the development of the NRTs,
legal definition trumps physical possibility. Although the chance of
a post-mortem child may be remote today, despite its physical
possibility, this is unlikely to remain true indefinitely. By legislat-
ing a mandatory pre-NRT view of science, the USRAP manages to
ensure that the Rule remains out of synch with reality. 9" The
concept of addressing the problem through a presumption is
pursued further in our proposed solution to the problem.
IV. REFORMING THE RULE
There are many proposed reforms to the Rule intended to solve
a variety of problems as well as a few directed specifically at the
problems discussed in this Article. In this section, we consider these
reforms in light of the NRTs and propose our own solution.
193 The explicit legal disavowal of the possible impact of the NRTs brings to mind the
Indiana legislature's attempt to define pi as 3.2. PETR BECKMAN, A HISTORY OF PI 174-77
(1976) (recounting story).
19 Professor Lynn, as noted earlier, "solved" the problems posed by the NRTs in a similar
fashion. Lynn argued that "Ijiust as a rational law on perpetuities excludes a conclusive
presumption of fertility, so too it excludes possibilities of adoption, conception, and birth that
run counter to the probable intention of the donor and preclude the reasonably prompt final
settlement of disputes over property." Lynn, supra note 34, at 237 n.42. The problem with
Lynn's argument is that the "rational" Rule he describes is not the Rule under any of the
proposed reforms or in any state that we are aware of. The Rule is rational and clear (at least
on this)-iving individuals are conclusively presumed to be fertile (except in a few states,
including Idaho, Illinois, New Hampshire, and New Jersey). IDAHO CODE § 55-111 (Michie
1979); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 305/4 (West 2001); W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities: New
Hampshire Defertilizes the Octogenarian, 77 HARV. L. REV. 279 (1963). See also In re
Ransom's Estate, 214 A.2d 521, 525 (N.J. Super. A.D. 1965) ("This state rejects the 'notion'
there is a conclusive presumption that a man or woman is always capable of bearing children
regardless of age, physical condition and medical opinion to the contrary." The court based
its ruling on a finding that "[tihe chance of becoming pregnant after the age of 50 is negligible,
and more so if the woman has passed through the menopause."); Fletcher, supra note 4, at
800-01 (summarizing "rules' for interpreting the Rule as including "[a] person, if male, may
impregnate a female person and a person, if female, may give birth to a child at any age
regardless of physical or mental condition' and "[t]hat an event is highly unlikely to occur is
no barrier to the challenger").
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A. THE LEACH SOLUTION
Professor Barton Leach, one of the greatest Perpetuities scholars
of the twentieth century, addressed the implications of cryopreser-
vation of semen in a slightly tongue-in-cheek 1962 article.' 95 Leach
analyzed four possible solutions to the dilemmas posed by cryopre-
servation and the "fertile decedents." First, Leach noted that
declaring posthumously conceived children illegitimate would be an
"easy escape" since it would remove them from the class of "chil-
dren."'96 Leach ruled this solution out as politically infeasible,
something that is certainly even truer today than in 1962.'9' Next
Leach considered whether the "rule of convenience" might resolve
the issue, at least in some cases. Under this principle of construc-
tion, classes close 98 for purposes of the Rule when any member can
call for a distribution of principal.1 9 Thus, a class gift "to such of
my children as reach age 25" could be valid (for the living children)
if at the time of the gift at least one child was already twenty-five.
Leach rejected this as a general solution because it would be
inapplicable to many transfers.2 °0
Leach's solution was judicial adoption of a rule of "visible
inconvenience."2°1 Under this approach, posthumously conceived
children of a sperm donor would be legitimate if conceived by the
donor's widow before she remarried, and "the duration of a male 'life
in being' under the Rule Against Perpetuities should be defined as
1'5 Leach, supra note 87. This article is about as funny as perpetuities writing gets.
196 Id. at 943.
197 See generally Johan Meeusen, Judicial Disapproval of Discrimination Against
Illegitimate Children: A Comparative Study of Developments in Europe and the United
States, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 119 (1995) (discussing rights of illegitimate children).
196 A class closes when no one else can join the class. Once a class closes, perpetuities
problems with respect to unborn children are eliminated.
199 Leach, supra note 87, at 944. Leach provides this example, which makes the
application of the rule clearer:
Thus where there is a gift to A for life, remainder to B's children, and B
has children at A's death, the class closes at A's death; but if B has not
had children before A's death, there are cases holding that the class
remains open for all of B's children.
215 Many transfers do not involve class gifts with conditions that are already satisfied at
the time of the gift and so not enough would be saved. Leach, supra note 87, at 944.
201 Leach provided a draft opinion wittily setting out this rule. Leach, supra note 87, at
944.
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the period of his reproductive capacity, including any post-mortem
period during which his sperm remains fertile" even through
cryopreservation.0 2 The result is that "gifts are as valid as if the
sperm bank had never been thought of' because the perpetuities
period is extended for as long as reproduction is possible. 20 1 Thus,
a post-mortem child would still be considered born within the "life"
of his father for purposes of the Rule. Although Leach considered
only the possibility of male genetic material being preserved, his
solution could easily be modified to include posthumously conceived
children of parents of either sex. In the alternative, Leach proposed
a statute providing cy pres for saving existing wills and irrevocable
trusts and the use of improved drafting for wills and trusts drafted
in the future.20 '
Professor Leach's expertise in the area of perpetuities is legend-
ary, but we nonetheless must disagree with Leach's solution for two
reasons. First, Leach's "visible inconvenience" Rule has the effect
of allowing those who store frozen genetic material to completely
escape the Rule or, at least, to indefinitely extend the period during
which gifts are good. By redefining "lives in being" to include the
period of post-mortem reproductive capacity,2 5 the Rule will no
longer strike any interest involving children or other descendants of
an individual who first preserves his or her reproductive capacity.
20 6
Leach's solution would allow the Rule to be undercut at will. By
preserving genetic material to extend one's life for purposes of the
Rule, an individual could make valid a gift "to my child A for life,
then to A's children for life, then to A's grandchildren for life, then
to A's great grandchildren" since the testator's life would now serve
as a measuring life by virtue of the preserved material. Such a gift
Id.
2M0id.
204 See id. (arguing for legislative enactments to save wills and trusts from perpetuities
violations by looking at intentions of creator of interest).205 Leach addressed the issue of sperm banks and so considered only men. See id. at 943
(discussing problems that can arise from sperm banks). This stemmed in part from his belief
that the technology did not allow an equivalent procedure for women. Id. Technology today
would allow women an equivalent opportunity.
200 Indeed, one individual who preserves genetic material could serve as the "life in being"
in multiple cases by being explicitly named in others' wills and other instruments.
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would strike directly at the heart of the Rule's prescriptions against
over-fractionation of title and dead hand control.
In crafting his solution, Leach assumed that the use of cryopre-
servation would be confined to a small number of people at risk of
radiation exposure (astronauts in particular). °7 Leach's assump-
tion, however, is no longer true. He also considered only one of the
several NRTs available now or in the near future. As a result, he
did not consider the impact of widespread availability of NRTs,
leaving his solution unsatisfactory under modern conditions.
B. THE THIES SOLUTION
Another alternative was proposed by attorney Winthrop D. Thies
in a 1971 article.0' Thies was concerned primarily with the
possibility that posthumously conceived children of a testator who
had cryopreserved semen would be deemed a measuring life, thus
extending the perpetuities period.0 9 His solution was to limit the
class of posthumously conceived children who qualified to those born
of the testator's widow.210 Alternatively, he proposed a limitation to
a number of years after either the testator's death or after the
testator would have reached a given age (Thies suggested seventy)
had he lived.21'
Thies' analysis of the problem is overly narrow. First, conceiving
children from frozen semen is only one possibility offered by the
NRTs. The NRTs therefore raise issues that Thies' solution does not
resolve such as the extension of women's reproductive capacity
beyond death. More importantly, Thies' proposal does not address
the issue of the impact of the birth of posthumously conceived
children on class gifts.212 Indeed, determining that a posthumously
'" See Leach, supra note 87, at 944 ("Use of the sperm bank will probably be limited to
relatively young men who, apart from the risks of the nuclear age, would normally far outlive
the fertility of the deposited sperm.").
Winthrop D. Thies, Property Rights and the Posthumously Conceived Child, 110 TR.
& EST. 922 (1971).
20 Id. at 922-23, 960.
210 Id. at 960.
211 Id.
212 As noted earlier, many class gifts are potentially invalidated under the common law
Rule because of the possibility that all living potential class members die and new,
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conceived child is a measuring life creates almost as many problems
as it solves because it could potentially greatly extend the perpetu-
ities period.
C. THE GESTATION RULE
One possible alternative for circumstances in which an actual
embryo exists is to extend the common law Rule that provides that
periods of gestation are added to the perpetuities period to cover all
embryos regardless of whether they are progressing toward birth or
not.213 The gestation rule covers the situation described by Profes-
sor Leach in the following example:
Example 6: T makes a bequest "to my children for their
lives, remainder to my grandchildren who shall reach
21" and has one living child and one unborn child, who
is born eight months later. This second child later dies
leaving an unborn child as well, who is also born eight
months later.214
The gift to the grandchildren is valid, despite the birth of a grand-
child outside the "lives in being plus 21 years" period because the
period is extended by the two gestation periods.215 In effect, the
gestation period could be defined to include storage of an embryo in
a facility.
posthumously conceived members are then born. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
213 One might foresee, for example, that in the future embryos could be brought to term
outside a woman's womb. See Sacha Zimmerman, The Real Threat to Roe v. Wade: Fetal
Position, THE NEW REPUBuc, Aug. 18 & 23, 2003, at 14 (stating that within five years
technology might allow for the gestation of fetuses outside a woman's body through
ectogenesis or artificial wombs). We therefore define the issue as whether the embryo is
"progressing" toward birth or is in a static state (as is an embryo that has been frozen). See,
e.g., Guzman, supra note 177, at 221-22 (suggesting that treating frozen embryos as "lives in
being" solves RAP problems "because any interest given to the embryo would always vest or
fail within its own 'life' "). Such a solution obviously does not apply to instances where the
embryo itself is created later.
2" Leach, supra note 158, at 642. Professor Leach took the example from Thellusson v.
Woodford, 11 Ves. Jr. 112 (Ch. 1805).
216 Leach, supra note 158, at 642.
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This solution is problematic, however, for several reasons. First,
it addresses only the subset of NRTs in which an embryo is created
before preservation of genetic material. To the extent differential
treatment of NRTs exists, the differential will create an incentive to
choose one NRT over another for RAP reasons-surely a poor basis
for medical decisions. Second, many embryos are frozen but never
implanted. They are stored indefinitely or ultimately destroyed by
the storage facility. Third, the extension of the gestation rule to
cover these circumstances is bad law. The cost of extending the
perpetuities period by gestational periods of under a year for a
limited class of beneficiaries (unborn children who have been
conceived) is relatively slight. Allowing an indefinite extension for
children born through NRTs, however, would effectively gut the
Rule by extending to infinity the potential gestational period for
future births.
D. REPEAL OF THE RULE
The problem could be solved by simply repealing the Rule, ending
its "reign of terror" once and for all.2 16 As Professors Levin and
Mulroney summed up the arguments of the advocates of repeal,
[1]ogic could lead one to argue that a social policy device
first sculpted to prevent the aggregation of assets in the
hands of several hundred noble families at a time when
London, the largest city in the common law world, had
less than 10,000 inhabitants, has outlived its justifica-
tion. While certain ownership behavior patterns were
politically and economically undesirable for a feudal
sovereign, these patterns do not present a clear danger
in our modern society.217
216 Many jurisdictions are selectively eliminating the Rule for particular interests. See,
e.g., Angela M. Vallario, Death by a Thousand Cuts: The Rule Against Perpetuities, 25 J.
LEGIS. 141, 148-53 (1999) (describing abolishment of Rule for particular type of long-term
trust known as "dynasty trusts").
217 Levin & Mulroney, supra note 25, at 356.
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As Levin and Mulroney note, however, such an approach neglects
the importance of the social interests served by the Rule-the
prevention of dead hand control and avoiding temporal fractionation
of ownership interests.218
As we discussed earlier, however, the Rule's ability to serve those
interests is limited by its complexity and incomplete coverage.219
Repeal of the Rule would increase dead hand control, although other
steps might be taken to directly, and perhaps more effectively, limit
such control. The NRTs provide a good excuse to repeal the Rule
entirely, since they require some action to solve the conceptual
problems they introduce. If the Rule were repealed, it would be
necessary to explicitly address fractionation of title and dead hand
control through some other mechanism.
Professors Levin and Mulroney suggest replacing the Rule in its
various forms with a carefully designed estate tax that would make
transfers intended to achieve long-term control of assets prohibi-
tively expensive. Such a tax
would render The Rule unnecessary as a means of social
control over property owners' efforts to tie up wealth for
excessively long periods after their deaths. Governmen-
tal control of such conduct would thus shift from the
judiciary to the tax sector and The Rule would become as
irrelevant to modern social policy as the destructibility
of contingent remainders and the Rule in Shelly's [sic]
Case.22'
Replacing the Rule with a tax eliminates the issues raised by the
NRTs, while maintaining the Rule's policy objectives. However, it
also mixes in new policy objectives concerning transmissibility of
wealth across generations which, in addition to being beyond the
scope of this Article, complicate the analysis. As we write this, of
course, the main news concerning estate taxes is their phaseout
218 See id. (noting that restrictions on alienation hinder needs of current owners).
219 See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
20 Levin & Mulroney, supra note 25, at 349.
21 Id. at 359.
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between now and 2010,222 making the notion of expanding them to
replace the Rule unlikely in at least the short term.
E. IMPOSING DEFINITIVE TIME LIMITS
Another possibility is to follow the USRAP and substitute a
defined time limit for the measuring-lives approach of the current
forms of the Rule, requiring that interests vest, if at all, within adefined time. 221 While this would eliminate some of the NRTs'
problems under the Rule, that is, those related to the impact of the
NRTs on the measuring lives, it would not solve all of the problems
posed by the NRTs. For example, requiring interests to vest within
ninety years as the USRAP does would not eliminate the chance
that a class gift (e.g., "to all the grandchildren of A") would not fully
vest within ninety years because of an NRT-related birth. It also
greatly increases the cost of the Rule by producing uncertainty
about the outcome of the application of the Rule for the length of the
defined time limit.
F. EXCLUDING POSTHUMOUS CHILDREN ONLY IF THEY PRODUCE RULE
VIOLATIONS
Professor Ira Bloom proposed a class construction rule to solve
class gift problems generally as part of a package of piecemeal
reforms aimed at eliminating some of the Rule's problems relating
to improbable events: "If an interest would be invalid under the
common law Rule by including afterborn persons within a class,
after-borns shall be excluded from the class to the extent necessary
to avoid a violation under the common law Rule."2 24 Such a rule
could easily be modified to address posthumously conceived children
by substituting "posthumously conceived" for "afterborn."
2 5
2' Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 501,
115 Stat. 38, 69.
m See Haskell, supra note 2, at 548-50 (arguing that period of Rule should be fixed
between 100 and 125 years).
22 Bloom, supra note 34, at 70.
22 A different term from "posthumously conceived" might be necessary if the Rule was to
consider embryos created before death but held in cold storage until after death. We have not
thought of a good shorthand term that includes such children yet, but a lengthy phrase that
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Although better than denying that such children can exist, this
reform's complete exclusion of such children from the gifts may be
undesirable in at least some cases. In the instances where such
children actually exist, grantors or testators (who have gone to some
trouble and expense to enable such children to be born by preserving
their genetic material) would presumably be more likely to want
such children to be included in a class gift than not. Moreover,
these children, conceived or born long after the testator's death, are
precisely the ones that cannot have their gifts rescued by the
expedient of substituting names of individuals for the class designa-
tion, since they do not exist at the time the will is drafted and thus
have no names.
A modified Bloom rule is thus problematic. By ignoring all cases
of posthumously conceived children, the modified Bloom rule
protects some interests that should be struck-for example, those
where the testator has made a gift with the knowledge that he or
she leaves behind stored genetic material and has written a will
that violates the Rule. By saving such interests, a modified Bloom
rule would undercut the policies the Rule serves. Nonetheless, the
modified Bloom rule suggests that a more tailored presumption
could solve the problem, as does the approach we discuss below.
G. THE RULE OF DISCRETE INVALIDITY
The Rule of Discrete Invalidity ("RDI") was first set out in detail
by Professor Robert Fletcher in 1968.226 Essentially, it consists of a
rejection of the 1794 English case of Proctor v. Bishop of Bath &
Wells.227 Under the approach taken by courts after Proctor, courts
do not separate out the various contingencies for evaluation under
the Rule, although they do allow drafters of instruments to do so.
Thus, as Professor Leach explained in his classic article Perpetuities
in a Nutshell, when
would cover this would be "posthumously gestated or implanted in a womb."
226 Robert L. Fletcher,ARule ofDiscrete Invalidity: Perpetuities Reform Without Waiting,
20 STAN. L. REv. 459, 462-65 (1968). Fletcher notes that the solution was previously outlined
by Professors Ernst Freund and William Walsh. Id. at 459.
2 126 Eng. Rep. 594 (C.P. 1794).
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a testator makes a gift to A upon either of two expressed
contingencies, one being remote and one not, the gift
takes effect if the valid contingency occurs .... How-
ever, if the testator has expressed only one contingency
and this may occur too remotely, the gift is invalid, even
though two or more contingencies are implicit in the
expressed contingency and the one of them that occurs
is not too remote.... This distinction is all a matter of
the form of words and of chance expressions used by the
testator. It has been widely criticized but almost
invariably followed.228
The RDI approach allows courts to subdivide gifts into the gifts'
multiple contingencies, which are each evaluated separately to
determine whether there is a Rule violation. Understanding the
RDI rule is easier through an example. Here we borrow an example
from Professor Susan F. French, another advocate of the RDI and
daughter of Professor Fletcher.
Example 7: "Gift to the first son of A to become a
clergyman, but if none, to B. A and B are alive at the
death of the testator, and A has no sons."229
Under the RDI analysis, we can identify, based on the conditions
precedent to each individual taking, three possible sequences that
would lead to vesting of the interest of either a son of A or a failure
of that interest, with a resulting vesting in B.230
(1) A has a son who becomes a clergyman. The gift
would vest in the son. There would be no validating life
because an afterborn son could become a clergyman
more than twenty-one years after the death of A, B, and
everyone else alive at the effective date.
Leach, supra note 158, at 654-55.
' French, supra note 47, at 338.
o Id.
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(2) A has a son (or sons), none of whom becomes a
clergyman. The gift would vest in B. There would be no
validating life because all afterborn sons might die
without having become clergymen more than twenty-one
years after the deaths of A, B, and everyone else. (B is
not required to survive to take.)
(3) A never has a son. The gift would vest in B. A is the
validating life because vesting must take place at A's
death.2"'
Under the RDI approach, each of these sequences is analyzed
separately, with the result that sequences one and two are struck,
but sequence three is not (so long as we do not consider the
NRTs).2 2 The gift to B if A dies with no sons is therefore valid.
Professor French's version goes on to apply reformation principles
to those gifts that fail.
Unfortunately, the RDI approach does not solve the NRT
problem. In Example 7, the NRTs make sequence three invalid
because A can have a son after his death who then goes on to
become a clergyman, so A is no longer available as a measuring life.
Nonetheless, the RDI approach offers drafters of instruments a
guide to protecting their instruments from NRT-based attacks.
Making all the contingencies explicit, for example, setting forth the
sequences of gifts explicitly and including NRT sequences within the
lists, will bring the instrument within the courts' ability to assess
each explicit contingency individually and thus save interests in
some cases. However, the problem remains of how to decide when
to "close the books" and determine that no posthumously conceived
or born children will appear. Although it will often be impossible to
prove that the deceased did not preserve genetic material at some
point during his or her lifetime, preventing the NRT sequences from
being ruled out, a will that considers NRT sequences can also
include language stating that the testator had not stored genetic
material and did not intend to do so in the future.
2' Id. at 338-39.
232 Id. at 339.
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H. OUR PROPOSAL
Reforming rather than eliminating the Rule requires addressing
the several conceptual problems posed by the NRTs for the Rule.
First, the NRTs vastly expand the set of interests that fail any
version of the Rule that incorporates the common law Rule and does
not simply rule out the possibility of posthumously conceived
children. The problems of the unborn widow and the fertile
octogenarian pale in comparison to the number of interests possibly
affected by NRTs. Second, the NRTs vastly expand the set of
impermissible class gifts. Third, the NRTs make possible events
previously excluded by reformers as sufficiently improbable that
they could be dismissed. Fourth, by reducing the set of interests
that pass the common law Rule, the NRTs restrict the options for
courts seeking to reform interests that fail under the Rule. Finally,
the NRTs potentially extend the gestational period of the Rule
indefinitely for children conceived but not yet born.
We propose that if the deceased did not explicitly provide in the
will for posthumous children,"' there should be a rebuttable
presumption that the will contains an implicit provision stating that
"nothing in this will shall be construed to provide an inheritance for
any posthumously born individuals."" 4 We propose a rebuttable
presumption rather than the USRAP's conclusive presumption in
recognition of the increasing likelihood that the NRTs will lead to
the birth of posthumously conceived children. This presumption can
be rebutted by evidence showing that the deceased intended at the
time of his or her death to provide for posthumously born children
but had not yet made such provisions prior to his or her death. For
' This proposal excludes, of course, children in utero who are covered by the gestation
rule. See supra notes 213-15 and accompanying text (discussing gestation rule).
2' This provision is similar in approach to the Uniform Parentage Act, which provides
that "[i]f a spouse dies before placement of eggs, sperm, or embryos, the deceased spouse is
not a parent of the resulting child unless the deceased spouse consented in a record that if
assisted reproduction were to occur after death, the deceased spouse would be a parent of the
child." UNIFORM PARENTAGEAcr § 707 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 358 (2000). Similarly, the
Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act provides that "[an individual who dies
before implantation of an embryo, or before a child is conceived other than through sexual
intercourse, using the individual's egg or sperm, is not a parent of the resulting child."
UNIFORM STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT § 4(b), 9C U.L.A. 371 (1988).
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example, suppose Joe and Mary Smith created frozen embryos.
Before they could revise their wills, Joe Smith is killed in a car
accident. The Smiths had made an appointment with their
attorney, informing her that they wished to revise their wills to
provide for children who are the products of those embryos, even if
they are born posthumously. Mary then chooses to implant the
embryos in her womb. Upon proof of Joe's intent, a gift in Joe
Smith's will to "my children" would then be read to include the
children born from the frozen embryos. Further, we propose that
the gestational period be limited to no more than ten months after
the embryo is implanted. The period during which the embryo is
frozen does not count as "gestation." Thus, the existence of an
embryo in storage could not be used to extend indefinitely the period
of gestation.
Now let us examine the implications of this reform for the Rule
Against Perpetuities. Consider Example 8.2"5
Example 8: T leaves Blackacre "to my grandchildren
who shall reach the age of 21." T and T's spouse S have
created cryopreserved embryos before T's death.
Since T has left no explicit provision dealing with the
cryopreserved embryos, the rebuttable presumption comes into play.
Since there is no evidence of intent by T to provide for posthumously
born children, the possibility that such children will be born is not
considered by the court in applying the Rule, and the gift passes the
Rule. Just as in Example 1, the court finds that any grandchildren
of T who reach age twenty-one will do so within twenty-one years of
the death of T's children that were born before his death, who can
thus serve as validating lives.
Now consider the impact of rebutting the presumption:
Example 9: T leaves Blackacre "to my grandchildren
who shall reach the age of 21." T and T's spouse S have
created cryopreserved embryos before T's death. Also
before T's death, T writes to T and S's attorney to ask for
m Example 8 is a version of Example I modified to include NRT facts.
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an appointment "to revise our wills in light of our
creation of cryopreserved embryos so as to provide for
the children who may be born from the embryos S and I
have stored, and their descendants, including any born
after my death." T dies before the appointment and the
wills have not been revised.
In Example 9, the evidence is sufficient to rebut the presumption.
The court must therefore consider the impact of the cryopreserved
embryos. Now the court must find that a child of T could be born
after T's death and that a grandchild could therefore be born more
than twenty-one years after any lives in being at the time of T's
death. Thus, the gift in Example 9 violates the Rule. The evidence
of T's intent to provide for posthumously born children thus causes
the gift to T's grandchildren to fail.
This outcome may seem contradictory-in the case where T is
planning to explicitly provide for posthumous NRT-related births,
the gift fails, while in cases where T has made no attempt to do so,
the gift succeeds. The contradiction is only superficial, however.
Where an individual is contemplating the possibility of posthumous
NRT-related births, that individual has an obligation to comply with
the rules governing wills and other transfers. Arranging for the
preservation of genetic material is an act that carries with it a
multitude of obligations-for example, one must provide for
payment for long-term storage and for disposition of the genetic
material after the donor's death. Indeed, provisions in contracts
with storage facilities now routinely include language dealing with
such eventualities."' Someone who is aware of the possibility of
posthumously born children should be held to the Rule's restrictions
on perpetuities. Moreover, any competent attorney faced with a
client who expresses a desire to provide for posthumously born
children ought to raise perpetuities issues with the client. Requir-
Sheryl A- Kingsberg et al., Embryo Donation Programs and Policies in North America:
Survey Results and Implications for Health and Mental Health Professionals, 73 FERTILTY
& STERILITY 215, 218 (2000) (finding that 92% of disposition agreements for donors address
divorce and 90% address death).
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ing such individuals to comply with the Rule thus serves its
underlying social purposes.
Holding people who have not contemplated posthumously born
children to the Rule in these circumstances is quite different.
Someone who has stored genetic material not to produce children
but as insurance against workplace hazards (Professor Leach's
astronauts, for example) or as an insurance policy against the death
of existing children, would not have reason to raise the issue with
an estate planner or attorney, and so is less likely to learn of the
perpetuities problem. Moreover, striking gifts made by such people
due to NRT-related contingencies widens the Rule's scope by
increasing the number of interests it strikes. As the various general
reforms adopted and proposed suggest, the problem with the
common law Rule was that it was overbroad in application.
Perpetuities problems in wills can almost always be "solved" by
proper drafting, including the use of "savings" clauses that instruct
courts to fix problems that may arise. An alternative to our
approach would be to imply such a savings clause where it is not
present in all instruments either through the courts or by legislative
action.
Our proposal is slightly different-we would allow the Rule to
continue to strike those interests that violate the Rule where the
creator of the interest has failed to explicitly provide a solution.
Striking interests that violate the Rule is important to serving the
policy interests of the Rule itself in limiting dead hand control. If all
wills and other instruments containing provisions that violate the
Rule because of NRTs are saved by an implied savings clause,
regardless of whether the Rule violation was intentional or not,
individuals desiring dead hand control will have no incentive to
avoid violating the Rule. In some of those cases, because of bad
lawyering or lack of resources, interests that violate the Rule will
stand for lack of a challenge. Moreover, it is generally true that
[t]he burden of exercising care in estate planning
necessary to realize testamentary freedom cannot be
alleviated but rather only deferred to litigation that
occurs after the testator's death when he is incapable of
exercising the same degree of control over communica-
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tion of his wishes. This simply shifts the premium on
factual knowledge, effective expression and good lawyer-
ing from the testator and his estate planner to compet-
ing beneficiaries and their litigators.
37
A generalized program of courts reading in savings clauses would so
shift the burden.
The law of wills and estates has an extensive body of rules
governing when courts are willing to look outside the will for
evidence of testator intent. That law balances the importance of
donor intent with the costs of expanding inquiry beyond the four
corners of the will.238 Our proposal is consistent with this effort to
balance donor intent and the reliability interest served by excluding
extrinsic evidence, although it defers less to donor intent than some
modern will reformation theories allow. One important rationale for
application of a rule limiting will reformation is that such a rule
limits the opportunity to exercise bias by finding evi-
dence of "mistake" more readily in cases involving
testators whose dispositive plans are unusual or unpal-
atable. By limiting courts to the unambiguous language
of the will, these testators receive assurance that their
wishes will not be overturned because they are unpopu-
lar. More generally, the rule-oriented approach offers
predictability to all testators, assuring them that their
wishes, if expressed unambiguously, will be respected.239
In the case of the Rule Against Perpetuities, this balance needs
to consider the additional factor of advancing the policies underlying
the Rule: one function of the Rule is to prevent some individuals
from implementing the plan they intend. Another is to prevent
unintentional creation of interests that vest too remotely. Our
solution handles these cases differently: striking interests about
237 Pamela R. Champine, My Will Be Done: Accommodating the Erring and the Atypical
Testator, 80 NEB. L. REV. 387,464 (2001).
' See id. at 391-426 (reviewing issues of how to balance testator intent and need for
certainty).
2n Id. at 401.
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which there is evidence that the donor intended to create an interest
barred by the Rule while protecting interests that, due to the
existence of the NRTs, violate the Rule unintentionally.2 40
Finally, suppose someone has stored frozen embryos and made a
bequest to those embryos. Could a donor make a valid bequest to
the embryos under our proposal? Within the limits of the common
law Rule's perpetuities period-limits that are quite flexible with
proper drafting--children born from frozen embryos over an
extended period of time could inherit. For example, a donor might
include a provision in his or her will that provides for a gift of a
specified property or sum of money "to such of my children as are
born from my stored genetic material within twenty-one years of my
death or the death of my spouse, S, whichever comes later."24' The
donor and the spouse, S, serve as the measuring lives, thus
validating the gift. Gifts to posthumously conceived children born
later than twenty-one years after the death of the longest surviving
spouse would not be valid, of course, but such gifts should be struck
because of the social policies underlying the Rule Against Perpetu-
ities. Our proposal would not generally hinder bequests to posthu-
mously born children. Its main function is to prevent the mere
possibility of posthumous children from eliminating interests given
to currently living individuals.
V. CONCLUSION
But wait-perpetuities problems seem to be rare in general, and
ordinary perpetuities problems are obscure and often based on
improbable and odd facts. Aren't more complex problems, based on
science-fiction-like reproductive technologiesjust, well, silly? Aren't
we just making up perplexing hypotheticals to bedevil the poor
readers of this article? No.
2'0 Something similar to our result could be achieved by implying an appropriate savings
clause into every will, excluding any NRT-produced descendants from all gifts and conditions
that would violate the Rule. We prefer our solution, since the striking of intentionally created
interests that violate the Rule provides an increased incentive to comply with the Rule. In
addition, we prefer not to imply language through court action if possible, thus avoiding
increasing the courts' discretion in will interpretation.
241 Another alternative would be "or within 21 years of the death of the last survivor of
my now-living descendants."
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The problems raised by the NRTs for the Rule are real. They are
likely to lurk undetected in wills, complex real estate development
contracts involving options or rights of first refusal, and elsewhere
until a party discovers a reason to litigate one. Such a case will
arise because the Rule provides a powerful economic incentive to
contest even hypertechnical violations-the winner takes all of the
disputed interest. It also provides a powerful incentive to settle
such claims: faced with a claim based on the NRTs and the Rule, a
prudent will beneficiary or other interest owner will hesitate long
before rolling the dice to see if she loses or keeps her interest. Even
a relatively small chance of winning may yield a challenger a high
enough expected value if the asset is large enough.242 Thus, NRT-
based perpetuities challenges are likely to emerge even if they do
not lead to court decisions because of the incentives to settle. When
they do, the challenges are likely to be in a context that threatens
to disrupt a significant number of personal and commercial
relationships. And once a court accepts an NRT claim, others will
appear.
As the complexity of past reform efforts testifies, fixing even
comparatively simple problems caused by the Rule is not an easy
task. Thus, the question calls for legislative intervention before a
problem arises. Adopting our proposed solution would give courts
a method for answering these thorny questions when they inevitably
arise. Alternatively, a comprehensive revision of parentage laws,
intestacy laws, and estate law to consider the impact of the NRTs
could produce other, more effective means of addressing the
concerns of the Rule and eliminate the need for a piecemeal reform
and, perhaps, for the Rule itself. Given the contentious nature of
the debate over reproductive and family issues generally, and over
therapeutic cloning in particular, we are not optimistic that any
such reform will take place soon enough to obviate the need for our
approach and are content to leave such a comprehensive solution to
those better versed in the relevant areas of the law. In the mean-
time, rethinking the Rule Against Perpetuities in light of the
scientific advances that threaten to make the Rule obsolete is
m For example, a 10% chance of winning a challenge for a $1,000,000 asset has an
expected value of $100,000, well worth a demand letter and some litigation.
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necessary if we are to avoid losing the Rule's important, if imperfect,
protections against dead hand control and over-fractionation of
property interests.

